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COPING WITH DEREGULATION: REDUCTION OF




W ITH PASSAGE of the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978,' Congress radically altered the manner in which
the nation's air carriers conduct business. An industry accus-
tomed to extensive government regulation and oversight was
suddenly exposed to the economic and market freedoms en-
joyed by most American industries.' Not surprisingly, the
few years that have elapsed since deregulation have been the
* B.A., 1977, Drake University; J.D., 1980, Southern Methodist University. Mr.
Jansonius is an associate with the Dallas law firm of Haynes and Boone.
** B.A., 1978; J.D., 1981, Baylor University. Mr. Broughton is also an associate
with Haynes and Boone.
I Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552
(Supp. 11 1978)).
2 Prior to 1978, the airline industry was governed by the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938 and subsequently the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. Under the regulatory scheme
fostered by these statutes, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) exercised tight control
over the entry of new carriers for service on domestic routes. Additionally, the CAB
was responsible for enforcing the air carriers' statutory obligation to serve both large
and small communities, certifying air carriers for service to new markets, setting rates
and fares, and enforcing the prohibition against unfair competition by airlines. For a
thorough discussion of pre-1978 airline regulation, see W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULA-
TION IN AMERICA (1970). The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 removed virtually all
restrictions on airline domestic route systems. Certified airlines are now free to begin
service to a new market without extensive government involvement. 49 U.S.C.
§ 155 1(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979). There is similarly little interference with a carrier's right
to discontinue service to a community. Id. § 1371(j)(1). Although a new carrier must
still be licensed by the CAB, the only requirement pressed by the CAB is a showing of
"fitness" to serve as an air carrier. Id. § 1388(b)(1) (B). Finally, the CAB has lost most
of its control over freight rates and passenger fares. Id § 1551(a)(2). The CAB is
scheduled to go out of existence on January 1, 1985. Id. § 1551 (a) (4). For a detailed
discussion concerning provisions of the Airlines Deregulation Act, see Callison, Airline
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most turbulent years in airline history.
Perhaps the most conspicuous post-deregulation change in
the industry is the proliferation of new carriers.4 Until 1978,
interstate airline travel was dominated by ten major carriers,5
and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was extremely spar-
ing in the licensing of new carriers.6 In the past four years, by
contrast, several new carriers have been established and a
number of previously intrastate carriers have expanded into
interstate service.7 For the most part, the new interstate air
carriers are non-union and have decidedly lower labor costs
than their older rivals.8 Most of the new carriers also operate
at lower cost by flying second-hand aircraft, refusing to inte-
grate ticketing and transfer services with other airlines, and
by leasing less expensive airport facilities.9
As a consequence of the rapid entry of relatively low over-
head airlines into the market and the removal of CAB control
over fares and route structures, the industry has experienced
Deregulation - Only Partially a Hoax. The Current Status of the Airline Deregulation Movement,
45 J. AIR L. & COM. 961 (1980).
:1 The impact of deregulation on the airline industry has been a popular subject with
journalists and academics. For a thorough discussion and analysis of this topic, see J.
MEYER, AIRLINE DEREGULATION: THE NEW ENTREPRENEURS (1984). See also J.
NEWHOUSE, THE SPORTY GAME (76-83) (1982); Brigance, Turbulence tn the Skies, DAL-
LAS,Jan. 1984, at 41; Toward New Policies For the Airline Industg, 6 ANNALS AIR & SPACE
L. 219 (1981); Challenges Reshape Airline Structure /Aftermath of Deregulatton], Av. WEEK &
SPACE TECH., Nov. 3, 1980, at 50.
4 See Upstart Airlines Are Stinging the Big Carriers, TIME, Dec. 12, 1983, at 50; New
Wrinkles.- The Upstart Airline Era, 109 FLYING 40 (Aug. 1982).
, In alphabetical order, the major interstate carriers historically have included
American, Continental, Delta, Eastern, Frontier, Northwest, Ozark, Pan Am, Repub-
lic, Trans World, United, and U.S. Air. Braniff International, historically one of the
major interstate air carriers, formally declared bankruptcy and ceased operations on
May 13, 1982. Braniff resumed operations, on a much smaller scale, March 1, 1984.
Continental Airlines filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in
1983, but did not completely cease air service.
6 In a recent interview, Southwest Airlines' President Herb Kelleher pointed out
that in 1938 "the same trunks were carrying 90 percent of the business and when de-
regulation occurred in 1978 the same trunks were still carrying the same 90 percent."
Brigance, supra note 3, at 45.
1 See generally CAB, CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD STAFF REPORT: COMPETITION
AND THE AIRLINES, at 125-34 (1982).
o J. NEWHOUSE, supra note 3, at 79; Upstart Airlines Are Stinging the Big Carriers, supra
note 4, at 50-51; Deregulation and Recession Realities Causing Major Shi in Labor Relations,
AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, Dec. 1981, at 44-46.
1 See CAB, supra note 7, at 165-94.
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immense price competition in major air markets.' ° For most
major carriers, the struggle to preserve their market share has
meant sometimes charging fares that are not adequate to
maintain profitability."1 In addition to price competition, the
prolonged downturn in air traffic due to the early 1980's re-
cession, limitations on landings and takeoffs imposed as a re-
sult of the 1981 air traffic controllers' strike, 2 and high
interest payments on newly acquired aircraft also have con-
tributed to airline financial troubles.
1 3
Successive years in the red have compelled the major air-
lines to find ways to reduce labor costs. At least two major
airlines have set up non-union subsidiaries in order to com-
pete on equal terms with their new non-union competition.'*
Some of the more troubled airlines have filed for protection
under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in an attempt to be
freed from costly collective bargaining agreements and other
obligations.' 5 Finally, most major carriers have tried to exact
'° The fare wars phenomenon has been frequently commented upon in the news
media. See, e.g., For Airlines Deregulation a Mirxed Blessing, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
May 31, 1982, at 69 (major airlines slashing fares on transcontinental flights); Wall St.
J., Apr. 7, 1983, at 38, col. 4 (TWA Cut Fares Between St. Louis and Four Other Cities
Because of New Competitor, Air One); Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1983, at 23, col. 5 (Air
Florida Inaugurates a "Match or Beat" Fare Plan); Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1982, at 18, col.
3; Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 1982, at 7, col. 2 (The latest offers of $99 fares are expected to be
prelude to renewal of year ago fare wars); See generally, CAB, supra note 7 at 196-214.
,, The Aflermath of Deregulation, VENTURE, Sept. 1982, at 50; Wall St. J.,Jan. 5, 1983,
at 25, col. 3; Wall St. J., July 1, 1982, at 1, col. 5.
12 In Aug., 1981, the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO)
called a strike affecting virtually all commercial airlines in the United States. The
initial effect of the strike was a severe cutback in the volume of traffic that could be
handled by the nation's busiest airports. Wall St. J., Aug. 7, 1981, at 21, col. 3. Subse-
quently, the government discharged all striking traffic controllers who did not heed an
order to return to work and established emergency rules restricting takeoffs and land-
ings at the nation's 22 largest airports. The Federal Aviation Administration regained
the capability to handle pre-strike traffic levels in April, 1983. Telephone interview
with Gene Barlow, FAA Air Traffic Services Department (Feb. 16, 1984).
,:1 One financial bright spot for airlines in recent years has been the stabilization
and, recently, the decline of jet fuel costs. Wall St. J., Mar. 28, 1983, at 10, col. 4.
More recently, increased traffic at higher fares has produced sizeable profits for some
large carriers and the prospects for a profitable 1984 appear strong. N.Y. Times, Jan.
19, 1984, at 25, col. 3. Given the number of variables affecting airline costs and the
industry's vulnerability to sizeable losses, however, continued improvement in the eco-
nomic picture of most carriers cannot be taken for granted.
4 See infra text accompanying notes 17-125.
' ' See infra text accompanying notes 126-129.
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concessions from unions to lower wages and enable more flex-
ible and efficient use of employees.16 This article will ex-
amine these approaches to lowering airline costs within the
contours of traditional labor law and will evaluate the impact
of deregulation on collective bargaining in a predominantly
unionized industry.
I. DOUBLE-BREASTED AIRLINES
The first noteworthy post-deregulation move to reduce la-
bor costs was by Texas International Airlines in 1980. Until
February, 1980, Texas International was controlled by Jet
Capital Corp., and its operations were substantially union-
ized. In February, 1980, however, Jet Capital Corp. formed a
holding company named Texas Air Corp. which assumed
ownership of Texas International. At the same time, New
York Airlines, Inc. was formed with ownership also vested in
Texas Air Corp. After this restructuring, Texas International
continued to operate in its traditional markets on a unionized
basis while New York Air commenced operations in the
northeastern United States on a non-union basis.'7 The obvi-
ous purpose of this form of corporate restructuring, some-
"l See infra text accompanying notes 173-281.
17 The facts surrounding formation of New York Air are set forth in Air Line Pilots
Ass'n v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 656 F.2d 16, 17-18 (2d Cir. 1981). This case arose after
Texas International and New York Air refused the Air Line Pilot Association's (ALPA)
request for recognition as bargaining representative for New York Air pilots. In its
complaint, ALPA alleged that Texas International and New York Air should be re-
garded as a single carrier for representation purposes and that failure to recognize the
union as representative of New York Air pilots constituted a violation of the employer's
duty to maintain the collective bargaining agreement and to bargain with ALPA
under Railway Labor Act (RLA) §§ 2, First and 2, Ninth, 45 U.S.C. §§ 152, First and
152, Ninth (1976), respectively. ALPA also alleged that Texas International unlawfully
was interfering with the right of New York Air pilots to choose a bargaining agent and
was unilaterally changing terms and conditions of employment. Since a representation
dispute was at the core of ALPA's allegations, the district court dismissed the action on
the grounds that the National Mediation Board (NMB) had exclusive jurisdiction
under RLA § 2, Ninth, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1976). Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Texas
Int'l Airlines, 502 F. Supp. 423 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). The Second Circuit affirmed dismis-
sal of the action, although it expressed concern over the fact that the representation
dispute differed from the types of disputes traditionally handled by the NMB. Air Line
Pilots Ass'n v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 656 F.2d 16, 24 (2d Cir. 1981). Currently, the issue
of whether New York Air and Texas International should be treated as a single carrier
is pending before the NMB.
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times referred to as "double breasting," was to enable Texas
Air Corp. to operate competitively with non-union commuter
airlines in some of the high density northeastern markets."8
This effort has been challenged by the Air Line Pilot's Associ-
ation (ALPA), and the issue of whether New York Air can
operate as a non-union airline is currently pending before the
National Mediation Board (NMB). 19
More recently, Frontier Holdings, Inc., the parent corpora-
tion of unionized Frontier Airlines, has formed a second car-
rier named Frontier Horizons which operates with non-union
personnel.20 By operating non-union, the holding company
believes that Frontier Horizon will be more competitive with
other new carriers serving a number of major cities from Den-
ver's Stapleton Airport. 2' The International Association of
Machinists and the Airline Employees Association filed peti-
tions with the NMB challenging the new airline's status as an
entity separate from Frontier Airlines.2
The establishment of a subsidiary corporation that denies
recognition to an incumbent union at the parent corporation
or sister corporation is not a per se violation of federal labor
,o Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Sept. 15, 1980, at 34; Bus. WEEK, Dec. 29, 1980, at
44-45.
11 See supra note 17.
2' See Woodburg, Small Birds in a Big Sky, TIME, Dec. 12, 1983, at 50-51; Frontier
Holdings Forms SecondAirline Subsidtiag,Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Aug. 15, 1983, at 33;
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, Jan. 10, 1984, at A-14.
2, Glenn L. Ryland, President of Frontier Holdings, estimates that Frontier Hori-
zons will be able to operate at six cents per available seat mile (ASM). This contrasts
with Frontier Airlines' current operating costs of nine cents per ASM. Av. WEEK &
SPACE TECH., Aug. 15, 1983, at 33. For average ASM costs of some other air carriers,
see infa note 194.
2 NMB Cause No. 5570 (Jan. 1984). See 1 1 NMB 16 (1983). Additionally, unions
representing Frontier employees have formed a coalition to protest the creation of
Frontier Horizon. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, Jan. 10, 1984, at A-14. On January
31, 1984, the Air Line Pilots Association and Frontier Holdings, Inc. entered into an
agreement precluding the holding company from establishing any other non-union
carrier besides Frontier Horizon. The agreement limits Frontier Horizon to operation
of no more than 7 aircraft. See Gallagher, All in the Family: Affiliated Airlines and
the Single Carrier Issue, ALI-ABA Airline Labor Law Course Materials (1984). Abil-
ity to control expansion of Frontier Horizon has been a major obstacle in negotiations
between Frontier and the Association of Flight Attendants, despite the agreement
Frontier reached with ALPA. See The Denver Post, May 26, 1984, at 10, col. 2.
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law.2 3 Rather, a subsidiary or affiliated company may law-
fully refuse recognition to the union so long as operations of
the two companies are sufficiently separate. 24 Either the New
York Air case or Frontier Horions case currently before the
NMB will explain for the first time to what length a union-
ized air carrier must go in setting up a non-union subsidiary
airline. 25 Under well-established decisions by both the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 26 and the NMB ,27
however, it is apparent that unionized air carriers must make
a substantial commitment to autonomy of the new airline if it
is to avoid being bound to the existing airline's labor con-
tract. It is also apparent that the threat of such double breast-
ing has become an important subject in collective bargaining
between airlines and unions. 8
A. Labor Management Relations Act Prnciples Governing
Maintenance of Separate Employer Status in Commonly
Owned Companies
Although airline labor disputes are generally governed by
the Railway Labor Act (RLA),29 the law relating to double
breasting has developed largely in cases decided by the
NLRB under the Labor-Management Relations Act
(LMRA).3 The principles developed by the NLRB in these
cases provide a helpful analog for examining the restraints
that will probably apply to the creation of non-union affiliate
airlines under the RLA.3 ' The LMRA prohibits an employer
2:1 The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and federal courts consider com-
mon ownership evidence that two nominally separate companies constitute a single
employer, but that factor alone is generally not enough for a finding of single employer
status. See, e.g., J.M. Tanaka Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 1029 (9th Cir. 1982);
Carvel Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 11 (1976); Gerace Constr., Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 645 (1971).
21 See, e.g., North Carolina State Ports Auth., 9 N.M.B. 398 (1982); Frank N. Smith
Assoc., 194 N.L.R.B. 212 (1971).
25 See supra note 17.
2" See infra text accompanying notes 30-73.
217 See infra text accompanying notes 74-121.
" See infra text accompanying notes 122-125.
45 U.S.C. §§ 151-181 (1976).
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1976).
See, e.g., Trans Int'l Airlines v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 650 F.2d 949, 959
(9th Cir. 1980),cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1110 (1981) (stating that for purposes of analogy it
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from simultaneously operating union and non-union compa-
nies by making it unlawful for an employer to "refuse to bar-
gain collectively with the representatives of its employees."32
Over the past fifteen years, refusal-to-bargain charges against
companies have arisen most frequently in the construction in-
dustry when a unionized company has created a second com-
pany to bid on non-union construction projects.33  In
determining whether these double-breasted operations are vi-
olative of the LMRA, 34 the NLRB has scrutinized the rela-
tionship between the two companies to determine whether
they are sufficiently separate and distinct to preclude a find-
ing that both companies constitute a "single employer.
35
As discussed below, four principal factors govern analysis
in this area: (1) interrelation of operations; (2) centralized
control of labor relations; (3) common management; and (4)
common ownership or financial control.3 ' Although few gen-
is appropriate to refer to the NLRA for assistance in construing the RLA); Pan-Am
World Airways v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 275 F. Supp 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
afd, 404 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1969) (stating that while cases decided under the NLRA
are not controlling under the RLA, they offer a cogent analogy in the solution of simi-
lar problems); International Assoc. Mach. & Aerospace Workers v. National Ry. Labor
Conference., 310 F. Supp. 905, 913 (D.D.C. 1970) (stating that while the NLRA can-
not be imparted wholesale into the railway labor arena, it may be referred to for assist-
ance in construing the RLA).
2: Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA), § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5)(1976).
1c, See generally FEDERAL PUBLICATION INC., DOUBLE-BREASTED OPERATIONS IN
THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY (1983). There clearly may be other motivations for
establishing a non-union company, but the traditional dichotomy in the construction
industry between projects performed with union labor and projects performed non-
union offers a motivation for dual operations not present in most industries.
LMRA, § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). In addition to a charge under
section 8(a)(5), the double-breasted issue may come before the NLRB as a result of an
unfair labor practice charge filed by an employer alleging that a union violated
LMRA, § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) by placing pickets at a non-union employer's
jobsite in order to force the employer to sign a collective bargaining agreement.
,r, See generally Bornstein, The Emerging Law of the "Double-Breasted" Operation in the
Construction Industry, 28 LAB. L.J. 77 (1978); Penfield, The Double-Breasted Operation in the
Constuction Industry, 27 LAB. L.J. 89 (1976); Comment, Double-Breasted Operations in the
Construction Industry." A Search For Concrete Guidelines, 6 U. DAYTON. L. REV. 45 (1981).
:; See infia text accompanying notes 40-73. See also Local 627, Int'l Union of Operat-
ing Eng'rs v. NLRB, 518 F.2d 1040, 1045-46 (D.C. Cir. 1975), affd in part, rev'd in part
sub nom. South Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local 627, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 425
U.S. 800 (1976), on remand, Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 76 (1977), afd sub.
nom. NLRB v. Al Bryant, Inc., 711 F.2d 543, 551 (3rd Cir. 1983); NLRB v. DMR
19841
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eralizations may be drawn concerning application of the
above four factors, a handful of well-established guidelines
are relevant to virtually every case presenting the single em-
ployer issue. First, common ownership alone is insufficient to
establish single employer status.3 7 Second, the single most
important factor is common control over labor relations. 8
Finally, the ultimate goal in applying the four-factor test is to
determine whether there exists an overall arms-length rela-
tionship between the formally unintegrated companies. 9
1. Interrelation of Operations
Interrelation of operations refers to the functional elements
of business common to both companies. Given the number of
businesses and industries subject to LMRA jurisdiction, it is
unrealistic to construct an exhaustive list of criteria indicative
of interrelatedness.4 ° In general, however, since the essence of
business is sales of a product or service, customer relations
Corp., 699 F.2d 788, 791 (5th Cir. 1983); Carvel Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 111 (1976); Park-
lane Hosiery Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 597, 612 (1973).
:1" See, e.g., J.M. Tanaka Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 1029 (9th Cir. 1982); Off-
shore Express, Inc., 267 N.L.R.B. 72 (1983); Carvel Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 111 (1976); Ger-
ace Constr., Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 645 (1971). Even where there is no element of common
ownership, two companies may be required to recognize a union as bargaining agent
for a unit of employees on grounds that the companies are "joint employers." See
NLRB v. C.R. Adams Trucking, Inc., 718 F.2d 869 (8th Cir. 1983). The "joint em-
ployer" test is essentially the same as the single employer test, except that greater
scrutiny is usually applied to analysis of the three remaining relevant factors.
: See Western Union Corp., 224 N.L.R.B. 274, 277 (1976), af'd, 571 F.2d 665 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); Gerace Constr. Co., 193 N.L.R.B. 645 (1971).
:,g Local 627, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 518 F.2d 1040, 1045-46
(D.C. Cir. 1975), afdon lht issue sub nom. South Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local 627, Int'l
Union of Operating Eng'rs, 425 U.S. 800 (1976). Accord Penntech Papers, Inc. v.
NLRB, 706 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 237 (1983); Soule Glass &
Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055 (1st Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Don Burgess Constr.
Corp., 596 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1979).
4 In one case, Frank N. Smith Ass'n, 194 N.L.R.B. 212 (1971), 21 factors were listed:
(1) identity of supervisors; (2) interchange of employees; (3) procedures for job estimat-
ing; (4) source of paychecks; (5) identity of accountant; (6) identity and source of em-
ployees; (7) type of work performed; (8) type and source of equipment; (9) vacation
policy; (10) telephone listing; (it) advertising; (12) bookkeeping and record keeping;
(13) client referrals; (14) bidding; (15) source of credit; (16) membership in employers'
association; (17) identity of officers and directors; (18) source of executive compensa-
tion; (19) number of employees; (20) hiring procedures; and (21) location of offices. Id
at 214-16.
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and account management are particularly relevant to single
employer analysis. For example, in the 1979 case of Los Ange-
les Marine Hardware Co. v. NLRB,4 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals highlighted the fact that two companies shared sub-
stantially the same customer base in determining that the
companies were substantially integrated.4 2 More recently, in
Penniech Papers, Inc. v. NLRB,43 the fact that a parent corpora-
tion purchased all of a subsidiary's products and did all bill-
ings for the subsidiary weighed heavily in the First Circuit
Court of Appeals' determination that the two companies
were a single employer.4
Shared facilities and equipment can also be extremely
damaging to a claim that two companies are separate. In Al
Bganl, Inc. , 5 one individual owned two companies engaged
in the drywall finishing business. Both companies were
housed in the same facility and overhead costs were split in
proportion to the gross volume of business done by each. Ad-
ditionally, equipment was shared by the two companies
under a compensation formula based on allocation of capital
depreciation. Noting that these compensation formulas did
not reflect fair rental value for facilities and equipment, the
NLRB refused to characterize the companies' relationship as
"arms-length." 46 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the Board's decision.47
Finally, centralization of administrative services for two
companies is frequently given special emphasis when analyz-
ing the interrelation of operations. Joint bank accounts, tax
returns, payroll preparation, clerical support, and profes-
sional services all evidence that the companies' operations are
4, 602 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1979).
42 Id at 1305. See also P.A. Hayes, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 230 (1976)(alter ego status
found where new company possessed 80 per cent of prior company's customer base).
- 706 F.2d 18 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 237 (1983).
- Id at 25.
260 N.L.R.B. 128 (1982), enforced, 711 F.2d 543 (3rd Cir. 1983).
Id at 139. Sharing of equipment and facilities will generally not undermine a
claim that two companies are separate, so long as reasonable compensation is paid. See
Gerace Constr., Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 645, 646 (1970); Howard Jenks, d/b/a Glendora
Plumbing, 165 N.L.R.B. 101 (1967).
.7 NLRB v. Al Bryant, Inc., 711 F.2d 543 (3d Cir. 1983).
1984] 509
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highly integrated.48 In Penntech Papers, Inc. v. NLRB,49 the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals viewed centralized purchase
of supplies and materials as evidence of interrelatedness.5" A
ready conclusion from the NLRB and federal court cases dis-
cussing interrelation of operations is that successful double
breasting requires careful separation of all phases of the com-
panies' business operations.
2. Centrahed Control of Labor Relations.
As previously mentioned, 5' centralized control of labor re-
lations is the most important factor in determining whether
two companies constitute a single employer under the
LMRA.5" Most often when the single employer issue arises
there is one entity or individual with the ability to control de-
cision-making at all levels of both companies. For this reason
it is important to note that the Board usually focuses on actual
control over labor relations in its analysis.53 To determine if
there is genuine centralized control over labor relations, the
Board generally examines the day-to-day personnel opera-
411See supra note 40.
706 F.2d 18, 25 (3rd Cir. 1983).
Id at 25.
See supra text accompanying note 38.
r' In at least one case, the NLRB suggested that this factor alone may suffice to
establish single employer status. See Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 562 (1973),
rev'd, 518 F.2d 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1975), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. South Prairie
Constr. Co. v. Local 627, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 425 U.S. 800 (1976), on
remand, 231 N.L.R.B. 76 (1977), afd, 595 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1979). In later cases, the
Board has withdrawn from this view. See Edward J. White, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1020
(1978); Appalachian Constr., Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 685 (1978). One recent decision indi-
cates that lack of centralized control over labor relations will preclude a single-em-
ployer finding unless there is an extreme degree of interrelation of operations. See
Offshore Express, Inc., 267 N.L.R.B. 72 (1983).
ro See Offshore Express, Inc., 267 N.L.R.B. 72 (1983) (two companies not single em-
ployer where neither has input into work rules of other company); Appalachian Con-
str., Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 685 (1978) (single employer found where daily supervision for
two companies carried out by same men); Tabernacle Sand & Gravel Corp., 232
N.L.R.B. 957 (1977) (two companies constitute single employer where same individu-
als are responsible for labor relations at both companies); Gerace Constr., Inc., 193
N.L.R.B. 645 (1971) (separate labor policies and fringe benefits package rebuts single
employer claim). But see Penntech Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18, 26 (1st Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 114 L.R.R.M. 2648 (1983) ("critical test" is present and apparent
means to control labor negotiations).
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tions of the subject companies. 4
Actual control over labor relations may be established by a
variety of evidence. For example, showing that the same in-
dividuals exercise power to hire, fire, and direct workers at
both companies is considered strong evidence of centralized
labor relations.55 Similarly, the Board will consider whether
supervisors in both companies are subject to control by the
same person,56 whether the new company's personnel policies
and practices are substantially similar to those of the pre-ex-
isting operation,57 and whether one company provides ad-
ministrative and clerical services to the other company for
carrying out personnel relations.5 Possession of authority by
the same person(s) to negotiate labor contracts for both com-
panies is also considered strong evidence of centralized con-
trol over labor relations," especially when other evidence of
active control over day-to-day personnel matters is present.6 °
The variety of means for establishing common control over
labor relations is well-illustrated by the Board's decision in
Tabernacle Sand & Gravel Corp. ,61 upholding an administrative
law judge's inference of such control based upon substantial
interrelation of operations and common identity of company
officers and directors.62
r4 See Al Bryant, Inc., 260 N.L.R.B. 128, 140 (1982), enforced, 711 F.2d 543 (3rd Cir.
1983); Gerace Constr., Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 645, 650 (1971). See also NLRB v. C.R.
Adams Trucking, Inc., 718 F.2d 869 (8th Cir. 1983).
See N.L.R.B. v. C.R. Adams Trucking, Inc., 718 F.2d 869, 870 (3rd Cir. 1983).
See Frank N. Smith Ass'n, 194 N.L.R.B. 212 (1971).
' See Edward J. White, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1020 (1978).
, Se. Western Union Corp., 224 N.L.R.B. 274 (1976), af d sub. nom. United Tel.
Workers v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
,9 See Safety Elec. Corp., 239 N.L.R.B. 40 (1978); H.S. Brooks Elec., Inc., 233
N.L.R.B. 619 (1980), supplemented, 247 N.L.R.B. 619 (1980).
11 See H.S. Brooks Elec., Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 889 (1977), supplemented, 247 N.L.R.B.
619 (1980).
6' 232 N.L.R.B. 957 (1977)..
62 Id at 960. See also Edward C. Kelly Co., Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 337 (1977). One
commentator has listed the following factors frequently relied upon as evidence of
common control over labor relations:
(1) Whether both operate on a closed shop basis; (2) whether both enti-
ties are operated with regard to craft lines; (3) whether pay rates are the
same; (4) whether the two entities maintain separate health and work-
men's compensation policies; (5) whether the same individuals conduct
high-level labor relations policies; (6) whether each firm has separate job
19841
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3. Common Management
The NLRB's analysis of common management as a factor
in determining single employer status, like its analysis of cen-
tralized control of labor relations,6 3 is concerned with the ac-
tual makeup of management rather than one individual or
entity's ability to control makeup of the management and ex-
ecutive team. Interlocking directorships are considered evi-
dence of common management,64 but a far more important
consideration is the extent of overlap among the companies'
corporate officers.65 Moreover, even where there is considera-
ble overlapping of officers and directors, the absence of inter-
related operations may preclude a single employer finding.66
Conversely, evidence that an individual exercises significant
managerial responsibility in the normal operations of both
companies is highly suggestive of single employer status.6 7
supervisors; (7) whether different individuals hire and control job super-
visors; (8) whether vacations are administered by separate individuals;
(9) whether separate individuals have authority to enter into, or refuse to
enter into, union agreements; (10) whether different individuals possess
the power to hire and fire; (11) whether different individuals control pay
scales; (12) whether the companies maintain different fringe benefit
plans; (13) whether one company renders services to the other for the
administration of labor relations policies, and, if so, whether that com-
pany is compensated for these services; and (14) whether the individual
who initially established the labor relations policies of the non-union en-
tity also played an active role in labor relations for the union firm.
Comment, supra note 35, at 62-63.
See supra text accompanying notes 52-62.
See, e.g., Penntech Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18 (ist Cir.), cerl. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 237 (1983); Carpenters Local No. 213, 201 N.L.R.B. 23 (1973); Gerace Constr.,
Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 645 (1971).
In Western Union Corp., 224 N.L.R.B. 274 (1976), affd sub. noma. United Tel.
Workers v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 655 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 827 (1978), there was
some overlapping of directors among a holding company and its subsidiaries. The
Board, however, held that the fact that each subsidiary had its own president and vice
president precluded a single employer finding. 224 N.L.R.B. at 276.
,l See Chippewa Motor Freight, Inc., 261 N.L.R.B. 455 (1982).
67 See Alle Arecibo Corp., 264 N.L.R.B. 163 (1982); Carpenters Local No. 213, 201
N.L.R.B. 23 (1973). Regular sharing of employees by a supervisor working for both
companies will generally result in a single employer finding. See Edward J. White,
Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1020 (1978); Tabernacle Sand & Gravel Corp., 232 N.L.R.B. 957
(1977); Edward C. Kelly Co., Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 337 (1977).
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4. Common Ownershz
Common ownership, the final element of the four-factor
test for determining single employer status, rarely is deci-
sive.6" Since common ownership is usually the reason for be-
ginning single employer analysis,69 emphasis on this as
evidence that two companies are a single employer would fre-
quently obviate the need for looking at further evidence.7 °
Nevertheless, common ownership is some evidence of single
employer status and the weight attributed to this factor varies
depending on the degree of commonality7" and the size of the
companies at issue. Common ownership will be more persua-
sive evidence of single employer status with regard to a small
business than with large corporations. This is due to the
greater likelihood that owners of a small business are involved
in day-to-day business operations and personnel manage-
ment." Finally, common ownership may be found to exist
- See supra text accompanying note 37.
,;9 A few well-known corporate structures give rise to most double-breasting issues.
One popular approach is to set up the new company as a wholly-owned subsidiary of
the pre-existing company. Under uniform corporation law, companies will be re-
garded as separate unless the subsidiary is merely the alter ego or agent of the parent
company or was established to avoid legal obligations of the parent. The wholly-
owned subsidiary approach is restricted by many labor contracts that prevent the sig-
natory employer from owning another company in the same line of business.
A second form of double-breasting involves creation of a holding company to own
the pre-existing company and new company as dual subsidiaries. This approach is
preferable to the parent subsidiary approach since it allows for greater separation be-
tween management of the two operating companies. To a lesser extent than with par-
ent-subsidiary double-breasting, this approach may also be precluded by provisions of
an existing labor contract. Both Texas Air Corp. and Frontier Holdings, Inc. followed
the holding company approach in establishing non-union carriers. See supra notes 17-
22 and accompanying text. Another form of double-breasting, peculiar to the con-
struction industry, involves establishment of separate divisions within a company to
perform on either a "merit" basis or a union basis. See generally, DOUBLE-BREASTED
OPERATIONS IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY, supra. note 33, at 4254 (1983).
7. See, e.g., Western Union Corp., 224 N.L.R.B. 274, 275 (1976),af dsub. noma. United
Tel. Workers v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 827 (1978).
71 Common ownership does not have to be complete in order to be considered evi-
dence that two companies are a single employer. See Edward J. White, Inc., 237
N.L.R.B. 1020 (1978). Common ownership as a factor will be far more persuasive,
however, if ownership is substanially concentrated in one individual or entity.
7 Compare Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055 (1st Cir. 1981) (fam-
ily ownership of holding company and two small subsidiary companies is evidence that
subsidiaries are a single employer) with American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists
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even though legal ownership is technically spread among a
number of individuals or entities if the individuals or entities
typically act on a unified basis.73
B. Single Employer Issue Under the Railway Labor Act
Labor relations in airlines engaged in interstate commerce
are governed by the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 4 rather than
the LMRA,75 and enforcement of the RLA is vested in the
NMB. At least two provisions in the RLA give the NMB
authority to decide when legally separate companies are to be
treated as one for union representation purposes. First, under
section 2, Fourth, of the RLA,76 a majority of employees in a
certain craft or class at a carrier have the right to choose an
agent for representation in collective bargaining." Second,
v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (communications divisions of the vast Hearst
Corporation are not a single employer).
7:1 See, e.g., DMR Corp., 258 N.L.R.B. 1063, remandedon other grounds, NLRB v. DMR
Corp., 699 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 164 (1983); Bryar Constr. Co., 240
N.L.R.B. 102 (1979); Safety Elec. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 40 (1978).
74 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1976).
7f, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-206 (1976).
" 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth (1976).
17 Id In the Railway Labor Act context the term "craft or class" is generally used
instead of bargaining unit to refer to a group of employees that constitute an appropri-
ate representation group. A group of employees is appropriate for representation if
they work for the same carrier and perform the same or related job functions. Under
the RLA, crafts or classes are organized on a system-wide basis, rather than being
limited to one facility or geographical location. See Ground Services, Inc., 8 N.M.B.
112 (1980); Georgia Ports Authority Marine Dock, 5 N.M.B. 269 (1970). The fact that
a properly elected union will represent employees throughout the airline's system adds
special importance to the definition of "carrier" under the RLA. For jurisdictional
purposes, "carrier" is defined in 45 U.S.C. § 151, First (1976). The section provides
that a "carrier" is any:
express company, sleeping-car company, carrier by railroad, subject to
the Interstate Commerce Act, and any company which is directly or in-
directly owned or controlled by or under common control with any car-
rier by railroad and which operates any equipment or facilities or
performs any services (other than trucking service) in connection with
the transportation, receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, refrig-
eration or icing, storage, and handling of property transported by rail-
road, and any receiver, trustee, or other individual or body, judicial or
otherwise, when in the possession of the business of any such 'carrier':
Provided, however, That the term 'carrier' shall not include any street,
interurban, or suburban electric railway, unless such railway is operating
as part of a general steam-railroad system of transportation, but shall not
exclude any part of the general steam-railroad system of transportation
1984] REDUCTION OF LABOR COSTS 515
section 2, Ninth, of the RLA78 requires the NMB to deter-
mine what employees constitute a craft or class and to "des-
ignate who may participate in the election."79
In early decisions concerning union representation of em-
ployees in commonly owned or affiliated companies, the pre-
dominant factor looked to by the NMB was reporting to the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). Companies that re-
ported separately to the ICC were presumed to be separate
employers.8 0 This limited analysis soon gave way to a more
expansive inquiry, however, as the NMB began to migrate
toward the NLRB's approach to single employer analysis. 1
New York Central Railroad Co. ,82 decided in 1941, marked this
new era of NMB inquiry into the operational relationship of
commonly owned carriers.
In New York Central, the NMB was asked to determine
whether the New York Central Railroad Co. and several
small subsidiary railroads should be treated as a single carrier
for representation purposes.83 Evidence presented to the
NMB showed that the New York Central and the subsidiary
now or hereafter operated by any other motive power. The Interstate
Commerce Commission is hereby authorized and directed upon request
of the Mediation Board, or upon complaint of any party interested to
determine after hearing whether any line operated by electric power falls
within the terms of this proviso. The term 'carrier' shall not include any
company by reason of its being engaged in the mining of coal, the sup-
plying of coal to a carrier where delivery is not beyond the mine tipple,
and the operation of equipment or facilties therefor, or in any of such
activities.
Id Airlines were expressly included within this definition of "carrier" by 45 U.S.C.
§ 181 (1976).
78 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1976).
79 Id
- See Saint Louis-Southwestern System, N.M.B. Case No. R-54 (1934).
8' See supra text accompanying notes 36-73 for NLRB's approach to single employer
analysis.
82 1 N.M.B. 197 (1941), afd sub nom. Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation
Board, 135 F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd on other.grounds, 320 U.S. 297 (1943).
83 The smaller railroads involved in New York Central included the Boston & Albany
R.R., the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago, & St. Louis R.R., the Michigan Central
R.R. and the Toledo & Ohio Central Ry. These companies were not subsidiaries of
New York Central in terms of stock ownership; rather, the smaller railroads each had
given long term leases on railroad tracks and facilities to New York Central. Switch-
men's Union v. National Mediation Board, 135 F.2d 785, 787 (D.C. Cir.), afg, New
York Central R.R., 1 N.M.B. 197 (1941).
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railroads operated as a unified railway system, that common
executive officers served both the New York Central and its
subsidiary companies and that there were many instances of
merged seniority rosters."4 Thus, even though the subsidiary
railroads filed separate annual financial reports to the ICC,
the NMB held that the New York Central and its subsidiaries
constituted a single carrier for representation purposes.85 In
enforcing the NMB's decision, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia explained: "[T]he [RLA] deals with re-
lations between carriers and employees engaged in perform-
ing transportation, and was obviously intended to apply to
operating carriers, not to bare corporate entities which exist
only for the purpose of receiving rentals and distributing the
proceeds . 86
In the past four decades, a handful of NMB decisions have
elaborated on New York Central's emphasis on system wide in-
tegration of operations. The first significant single carrier de-
cision by the NMB after New York Central was San Antonio,
Ulvalde & Gulf Railroad Co. ,87 which emphasized the impor-
tance of payroll preparation, seniority lines, and corporate
accounting.88 There, even though the San Antonio, Ulvade
and Gulf Railroad Co. (SAUG) and its parent company8 9
were operated with a great deal of coordination in railway
operations, and shared many of the same executive and oper-
ating officers, the NMB held that SAUG was a separate en-
tity for representation purposes 0 The NMB was persuaded
Id at 789-90.
" Id. at 787.
Id at 790.
2 N.M.B. 157 (1950).
Id at 160-62.
" The San Antonio, Ulvade and Gulf Coast R.R. (SAUG) was a subsidiary of the
Missouri-Pacific R.R. The single employer issue in this case arose from a petition by
the Order of Railway Conductors of America (ORC) to investigate a representation
dispute between it and the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen (BRT). The ORC
sought an election among most conductors at SAUG, who traditionally had been rep-
resented by the BRT. In opposition to an election, the BRT asserted that SAUG was
not a separate employer and that any election involving SAUG employees would have
to be a part of an overall unit of Missouri-Pacific R.R. employees and all subsidiary
companies. Id at 157.
Id at 168.
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that SAUG's control over routine labor relations matters, its
history of collective bargaining as a separate employer, and
its separate accounting and financial reporting practices justi-
fied its treatment as a separate employer from its parent
company.9'
In more recent years, the NMB has addressed the single
carrier issue in cases involving commonly owned air carriers.
Air Florida, Inc. ,92 decided in 1979, involved a petition by the
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Work-
ers (LAM) to certify a bargaining class consisting of employ-
ees from Air Florida and its subsidiary, Air Sunshine. The
NMB did not make a determination on the single carrier is-
sue, but in returning the petition to the NMB hearing officer
for resolution of the bargaining class question, the NMB
listed the following factors as relevant to determining
whether Air Florida and Air Sunshine were a single employer
for representation purposes:
1. Background information about the operations of the
two carriers, including numbers and types of aircraft and em-
ployees revenues and schedules.
2. Information regarding the transition from intrastate to
interstate carriage, the acquisition of Air Sunshine by Air
Florida, and future plans.
3. Location of facilities.
4. Interlining and/or leasing agreements between Air
Florida and Air Sunshine.
5. Interchange of personnel and maintenance work.
6. The extent to which there are common ownership, of-
ficers, directors and employers and sharing of payroll and
computer facilities.
7. History of collective bargaining.9 3
The seven factors listed in Air Florida were never applied to
a determination of the single carrier status of Air Florida and
Air Sunshine, since Air Sunshine was subsequently merged
, Id at 166-167.
92 7 N.M.B. 61 (1979).
9 Id. at 62.
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into Air Florida and all indicia of separateness removed.94
Nevertheless, Air Florida illustrates that, like the NLRB, the
NMB is most concerned with actual interrelation of opera-
tions among commonly owned companies and common exer-
cise over labor relations policies and practices.95
The NMB's 1980 decision in Republic Ai'rines96 echoes Air
Florida's emphasis on control over labor relations. The dis-
pute in Repubhc Airlines arose from Republic's acquisition of
Hughes Air West, and its plans to operate Hughes Air West
as a subsidiary known as Republic West d/b/a Republic.
Mechanics of Hughes Air West were represented by the Air-
craft Mechanics Fraternal Association (AMFA), and Repub-
lic mechanics were represented by the IAM. 97 After the
acquisition of Hughes Air West, however, Republic planned
to recognize the LAM as representative for mechanics of both
Republic Airlines and Republic West.98 Accordingly, in its
petition to the NMB, AMFA asserted that Republic West
would be a separate carrier and that the AMFA should retain
its right to represent Republic West mechanics. 99 Republic,
on the other hand, contended that the two airlines would be
operationally integrated and should be treated as one for rep-
resentation purposes."
SId
See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. NMB concern with common control
over labor relations is also expressed in Air Lift Int'l, Inc., 4 N.M.B. 142 (1967). There,
in determining that employees of Air Lift and another carrier that had been acquired
by Air Lift, Slick Airways Division of the Slick Corporation, should be treated as one
bargaining unit, the NMB explained:
[W]here an issue arises relating to "carrier status" .. the Board must of
necessity take into consideration, among other factors, whether or not
the employees of the carrier or carriers have, in fact, been merged and
are subject to the direction of a single management having the sole au-
thority to supervise and direct the manner of rendition of the services of
those employees.
Id. at 145.
8 N.M.B. 49 (1980).
97 Id. at 50.
Id at 52.
-Id at 51.
- Id Republic's position was precisely the opposite of the position an airline would
take if it were trying to go double-breasted. Republic's reasons for desiring to operate
Republic West as a subsidiary instead of merging it into Republic were primarily tax-
related. Hughes Air West had a 40 million dollar tax loss that could be carried for-
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The NMB agreed with Republic and denied AMFA's peti-
tion to clarify Republic West as a separate carrier. A signifi-
cant factor in the NMB's analysis was Republic's intention to
hold Republic West and itself out to the public as a single
airline and to operate as a single transportation system with
through-service across the Republic and Republic West route
system.' O' The NMB further noted that labor relations for
both airlines would be handled by Republic, that Republic
West would have no labor relations staff of its own, and that
the two airlines would eventually have an integrated payroll
and reservation system. 10 2 In concluding, the NMB stated
that "[t]he CAB may approve of a two corporation set-up for
purposes of economic regulation, however, this Board may
pierce the corporate veil for purposes of rational labor-manage-
ment relations."103
The phrase "rational labor-management relations" has
been used by the NMB in other single carrier cases in recent
years.'0 4 In Ground Services, Inc. ,1o5 the United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America (Carpenters) petitioned
the NMB for resolution of a representation dispute involving
aircraft maintenance and service employees of Ground Serv-
ices, Inc. (GSI) at the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood Interna-
tional Airport. 10 6  GSI is an aircraft servicing company
operating at several major airports in the United States under
ward if it retained its separate legal identity but which would be lost if it were merged
into Republic. Additionally, Hughes Air West was a recipient of a 7.5 million dollar
annual inflation-adjusted subsidy from the U.S. government. Republic was not eligi-
ble for this subsidy. Id at 53.
,, Id. at 55. The NMB stated that it no longer approved the position it had taken
in the railroad industry where some affiliated railroads with highly integrated opera-
tions were considered separate carriers for representation purposes. See, e.g., San
Antonio, 2 N.M.B. 157 (1950), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 87-91.
oz Republic Airlines, 8 N.M.B. at 55.
Id (emphasis supplied).
One commentator has suggested that the phrase "rational labor-management re-
lations" is now the key concept in NMB's single employer analysis. Gallagher, All In
The Family' Affiliated Carriers and the Single Carrier Issue, ABA-ALI AIRLINE LABOR LAW
COURSE MATERIALS (1982). Emphasis on this phrase suggests NMB single employer
analysis focuses on whether the carriers operate as one transportation system and man-
age employees as though they are a part of a single transportation network.
8 N.M.B. 112 (1980).
I' d.
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contract with many airlines.' °7 The issue raised by the
Carpenters' petition was whether GSI was a joint employer,
along with the relevant airline, at each airport where GSI
had aircraft maintenance contracts.10 8
Again relying on the phrase "rational labor-management
relations," ' 9 the NMB held that, for representation purposes,
GSI employees should be considered employees of the partic-
ular airline whose aircraft they are servicing."0 The NMB
rejected its usual system-wide approach to class or craft-unit
determinations, emphasizing that "[d]ay-to-day operations
are tailored to local conditions, and are not highly centralized
because it is the airlines which control GSI's work, and that
work varies considerably by city and by airline.""' Given
the airline's control over day-to-day work of GSI employees,
the NMB considered it inappropriate to certify GSI as a sin-
gle employer for representation purposes.2
One recent decision illustrates the degree of separateness
necessary to satisfy the NMB that a newly established entity
is not a single employer along with its creator. NMB services
were invoked in North Caroh'na State Ports Authority 113 when the
International Longshoremens Association (ILA) filed a peti-
tion alleging a representation dispute concerning employees
of the North Carolina State Ports Authority (Ports Author-
ity) and North Carolina Port Railway Commission (Railway
Commission).1 4 For several years, the Ports Authority oper-
ated a railway system and the ILA was recognized as repre-
sentative of dock workers and security guards employed by
the railway system." 5 When the state of North Carolina es-
- Id. at 113.
' Id at 117.
, Id at 116.
"0 Id at 117.
Id. at 116.
1,2 Id at 117.
". 9 N.M.B. 398 (1982).
114 Id.
- Ultimate recognition of the ILA was preceded by repeated NMB and federal
court proceedings concerning the status of the Ports Authority as a "carrier" and a
myriad of other legal issues. See International Longshoreman's Ass'n v. North Carolina
Ports Auth., 511 F.2d 1007, 1008 (4th Cir. 1975).
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tablished the Railway Commission, however, the Ports Au-
thority transferred all railroad facilities to the Railway
Commisssion and ceased railroad operations. The Railway
Commission hired only two Ports Authority employees and
refused to recognize the ILA. 1 6
The ILA contended that the creation of the Railway Com-
mission by the state of North Carolina was an attempt to cir-
cumvent the employer's duty to recognize the union as
bargaining agent for railway employees. 1 7 The ILA argued
that the effort should fail on grounds that the Ports Authority
and Railway Commission operated as a unified transporta-
tion system and constituted a single carrier." 8 In response to
the ILA allegations, the Railway Commission argued that it
was a distinct and separate operating entity because (1) it
performed the same start-up operations that would be ex-
pected of any new carrier, such as acquiring rights of way,
negotiating contracts, and hiring personnel; (2) Railway
Commission employees were not subject to control or supervi-
sion by Ports Authority management; (3) the Railway Com-
mission prepared its own payroll and billing records; (4)
Railway Commission business and banking tansactions were
conducted separately from the Ports Authority; and (5) Rail-
way Commission and Ports Authority offices were geographi-
cally and organizationally separate." 9
Based on findings of fact supporting the Railway Commis-
sion, the NMB held that the Ports Authority and Railway
Commission were separate carriers for representation pur-
poses. 120 The NMB attributed little significance to the
union's suggestion that the state's sole motivation for creating
the Railway Commission was to deny Ports Authority em-
ployees effective collective bargaining representation. 12 ' The
lesson that can be inferred from North Caroh'na State Ports Au-
thority is that the RLA will not prevent an existing carrier




20 Id. at 409.
2 Id
1984]
522 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
from establishing a new carrier for the purpose of operating
non-union so long as the existing carrier is prepared to vest
the carrier with substantial operating and management
autonomy.
C. Contract Restrictions on Double-Breasting
Texas Air Corporation's formation of New York Air 122 and
the difficulty encountered by some major airlines competing
with non-union carriers in busy air markets has made double-
breasting an important subject in collective bargaining in the
early 1980's. At least one carrier, United, benefited from the
double-breasting controversy by obtaining concessions from
the ALPA in exchange for an agreement not to establish a
non-union subsidiary to operate in well-travelled routes in
the midwest and northeast. 123  Other airlines that have
agreed not to go double-breasted include Western and Flying
Tiger. 124 Notably, no federal court, or the NMB, has deter-
mined whether a "New York Air" clause is a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining that may be insisted upon by a union to
the point of impasse in collective bargaining. Nevertheless, a
restriction on an employer's right to establish a separate com-
pany in the same line of business is not a type of provision
generally considered a mandatory subject of bargaining and
probably cannot be compelled by a union. 125
D. Conclusions
The NMB's forthcoming decisions in the New York Air and
'2 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
121, For a discussion concerning United's contract negotiations with the ALPA lead-
ing to agreement on the "non-double-breasting" clause, see Northrup, The New Em-
ployee Relatons Clinate In Airhhes, 36 INDUS. AND LAB. REL. REV. 167, 173-74 (1983).
12 See Gallagher, Al/ In the Family: Affiliated Azrhes and the Single Carrier Issue, in ABA
- ALI AIRLINE LABOR LAW COURSE MATERIALS 294 (1983).
12r, A "New York Air" clause that prohibits a carrier from establishing an affiliate or
subsidiary that operates non-union is a permissive subject of bargaining, but probably
is not mandatory. See Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203
(1964); Japan Air Lines Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 538 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.
1976). See also Gallagher, supra note 124, at 294. A union cannot insist on bargaining
over a non-mandatory subject or go on strike in support of its position on a non-
mandatory subject of bargaining.
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Fronti'er Holdings double-breasting cases should significantly
clarify what degree of separateness is necessary to go double-
breasted in the airline industry. Existing NMB and NLRB
authority indicates, however, that double-breasting will not
succeed if the resulting two airlines are to be operated as an
integrated transportation system. In the final analysis, airline
double-breasting is most likely to survive NMB scrutiny if the
existing company is content to operate the new carrier as a
transportation system that is not coordinated with or
designed to facilitate the transportation system of the existing
carrier. Accordingly, the value of double-breasting as a
means to reduce overall labor costs is minimized by the dupli-
cation of costs in such matters as airport gate leasing, person-
nel administration, advertising, and a variety of other
administrative operations. Creation of a non-union affiliate
or subsidiary is most inappropriate for financially troubled
air carriers that would be burdened further by high start-up
costs.
II. AIRLINE BANKRUPTCY
Creating a non-union subsidiary airline to reduce overall
labor costs is an option open only to financially sound carri-
ers. Some of the more troubled airlines, by contrast, have
had to resort to far less attractive measures in order to reduce
labor costs and, hopefully, survive. In May of 1982, Braniff
Airways filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code 12 6  and completely ceased operations. 127
More recently, Continental Airlines sought similar relief, al-
though, unlike Braniff, it continued to operate. 128 The rejec-
i 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1300 (Supp. III 1979).
,21 In re Braniff Airways Inc., 25 Bankr. 216, 219 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982). After
filing for reorganization, Braniff rejected its collective bargaining agreements. Braniff
resumed operations in March, 1984 as a subsidiary of the Hyatt Corporation. Dallas
Morning News, March 2, 1984, at 1, col. 1. Braniff will continue to recognize the
unions which represented Braniff employees prior to bankruptcy, but its renegotiated
labor contracts are much more favorable to the airline. 106 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 38
(1983).
- Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 12, Jan. 19, 1984, at A-5. In In re Continental Air-
lines Corp., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 69,604 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex., Jan. 17, 1984), it was held that Continental did not act in bad faith against its
employees when it filed for bankruptcy, ceased operations for three days, and then
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tion of collective bargaining agreements covering many of
Continental's employees was, according to the airline's man-
agement, a cornerstone of its ability to continue opera-
tions.'29 Although a bankruptcy court has the authority to
relieve an employer of obligations under a labor contract,"3 °
bankruptcy does not automatically enable an employer to re-
duce its labor costs. This section will discuss the limitations
and conditions on bankruptcy relief for financially troubled
airlines.
A. Interplay of Railway Labor Act and Bankruptcy Code
Section 6 of the Railway Labor Act 31 establishes a detailed
procedure governing mid-term rejection or change in con-
tractual terms or conditions of employment made by a carrier
covered by a collective bargaining agreement. 132  With pas-
resumed operations with fewer employees who were paid at substantially reduced
levels of pay and benefits.
,21 144 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 224, 224-25 (Nov. 21, 1983). Philip J. Bakes, Vice
President and Chief Operating Officer of Continental Airlines, stated that the primary
reason for Continental's financial problems was that its "labor costs were well out of
line with costs of much of our competition." Id Bakes further explained that Conti-
nental was paying pilots an average of g $89,000.00 per year in salary and benefits for
55 hours of flying time and 78 hours of total duty time per month, while the competi-
tion paid its top pilots $33,000 per year for 83 hours per month of flying time. Conti-
nental's flight attendants were compensated at the rate of $39,000.00 per year, double
what the competition paid. Id. A January 17, 1984, Memorandum Opinion of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, In re Continental Airlines
Corp., Consol. Case No. 83-04019-142-5 (Bankr. S.D. Tex., Jan. 17, 1984) also cited
Continental's labor costs as a primary reason for the airline's financial woes.
,:o Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (Supp. III 1979). Prior to
the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the power to reject executory con-
tracts was found in 11 U.S.C. § 313 and section 516 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
which provided that a court could permit rejection of executory contracts of the debtor
upon notice to the parties to the contract.
45 U.S.C. § 156 (1976) [hereinafter cited as "RLA"].
Id. 45 U.S.C. § 156 provides as follows:
Carriers and representatives of the employees shall give at least thirty
days written notice of an intended change in agreements affecting rates
of pay, rules, or working conditions, and the time and place for the be-
ginning of conference between the representatives of the parties inter-
ested in such intended changes shall be agreed upon within ten days
after the receipt of said notice, and said time shall be within the thirty
days provided in the notice. In every case where such notice of intended
change has been given, or conferences are being held with reference
thereto, or the services of the Mediation Board have been requested by
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sage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,1'3 Congress cre-
ated some confusion over the application of section 6 of the
RLA to airline bankruptcy. Section 77(n) of the previous
Bankruptcy Act unequivocally stated that "[n]o judge or
trustee acting under this Act shall change the wages or work-
ing conditions of railroad employees except in the manner pre-
scribed by the Railway Labor Act." '134 By contrast, the
counterpart to section 77(n) in the Bankruptcy Code of 1978,
section 1167,' provides that "wages or working conditions of
employees of the debtor established by a collective bargain-
ing agreement that is subject to the Railway Labor Act shall not
be changed except in accordance with section 6 of the Rail-
way Labor Act. '13 6 Even though this section appears in a
sub-part of the Code that expressly applies only to rail-
roads,1 37 some commentators have argued that its broader
language precludes cancellation of airline obligations under
a collective bargaining agreement in a Chapter 11 reorgani-
zation case. 8
This interpretation of section 1167 was rejected by the
Bankruptcy Court in In re Braniff Airways. 139 The court rea-
soned that the change in wording between section 1167 and
its predecessor in the old Bankruptcy Act was merely the re-
sult of a change in statutory organization and that there was
either party, or said Board has proffered its services, rates of pay, rules,
or working conditions shall not be altered by the carrier until the contro-
versy has been finally acted upon, as required by section 155 of this title,
by the Mediation Board, unless a period of ten days has elapsed after
termination of conferences without request for or proffer of the services
of the Mediation Board.
Id
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (Supp. III
1979)).
14I 1 U.S.C. § 205(n) (repealed) (emphasis added).
1:.r. 11 U.S.C. § 1167 (Supp. III 1979).
.... Id (emphasis supplied).
, Section 1167 appears in subchapter IV of chapter I I of the Bankruptcy Code of
1978. 11 U.S.C. 103(g) expressly states that "Subchapter IV of chapter I I of this title
applies only in a case under such chapter concerning a railroad." Id
See Simon, Labor Relations In the Airline Industry Under the Bankruptcy Code, in ABA-
ALI AIRLINE LABOR LAW COURSE MATERIALS 318-21 (1983).
,:, 25 Bankr. 216 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982).
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no indication that Congress intended a change in the law. 4°
As a result of Branif Airways and Congress' inclusion of sec-
tion 1167 in a sub-part of the Code expressly limited to rail-
roads, it is unlikely that any bankruptcy court will defer to
section 6 of the RLA in airline bankruptcies.1
4 1
B. General Considerations Concerning Bankruptcy Rejection of
Labor Contracts
A financially troubled company has an option between two
types of proceedings under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978.142 Under Chapter 7, a company may go out of business
and liquidate its assets for distribution to the creditors.1
43
Chapter 11 of the Code, by contrast, provides the debtor with
the opportunity to reorganize its debts and to remain in
business. 141
To facilitate reorganization, section 365(a) of the Code
gives a trustee in bankruptcy the power, subject to court ap-
proval, to assume or reject executory contracts of a debtor.'45
The term "executory contract" has routinely been inter-
,40 Id at 217. See also In re Continental Airlines, No. 83-04020-142-5 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. Jan. 17, 1984).
14, In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984), the Supreme Court
stated in dictum that "[s]ection 1167 . . . expressly exempts collective bargaining
agreements subject to the Railway Labor Act." Id. at 1194. The authors submit that
the Court did not intend to suggest that airlines are included in the section 1167 ex-
emption, but merely adopted the statutory language without consideration of the
Code's clear restriction of section 1167 to railroads.
" 11 U.S.C. § 109(b), (d). See Comment, The Bankruptcy Law's Eject on Collective Bar-
gaining Agreements, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 391 n.4 (1981).
43 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-66 (Supp. III 1979).
,44 The procedure for reorganization is initiated by the filing of a petition with the
Bankruptcy Court which automatically stays creditor action against a debtor. 11
U.S.C. § 362. This enables the debtor to confer with its creditors to negotiate a com-
promised plan for repayment. Meanwhile, the court may either appoint a trustee to
run the business or may allow the debtor to continue operations as a debtor in posses-
sion. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1107(a). The House Report explaining section 1107(a) states
that the provision is intended to place a debtor in possession in the shoes of a trustee.
With the exception of investigative duties, the debtor is given all the rights, powers and
duties of a Chapter 11 trustee. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 404 (1977),
reprt2ed in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5902.
-, II U.S.C. § 365(a) (Supp. III 1979) provides: "Except as provided in sections 765
and 766 of this title and in subsection (b), (c) and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject
to the court's approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease
of the debtor." Id.
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preted by the courts to include collective bargaining agree-
ments, 146 but there is considerable controversy over the
standard that should govern rejection of obligations created
by a labor contract. 47  With regard to most executory con-
tracts, rejection by a trustee is proper simply by finding that
rejection would be in the best interest of the debtor. 48 As a
result of the RLA and LMRA provisions protecting the inter-
ests of persons covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment,' 49 however, labor contracts are accorded a level of
importance not shared by other types of executory
contracts.
50
The purpose of a reorganization is to restructure the busi-
ness' finances by extending or reducing its debts in order to
provide for financial rehabilitation of the business.' 5' The
,4, In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982),cert. granted sub. nom. NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco, 103 S. Ct. 8082 (1983); Brotherhood of Ry. and Airline Clerks v. REA Ex-
press, Inc., 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975); Shopmen's Local
Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prod., Inc., 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975).
", See Note, The Labor-Bankruptcy Confi'ct Rejecton of a Debtor's Collective Bargaining
Agreement, 80 MICH. L. REV. 134 (1981).
- Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 79.
,49 See supra notes 131-132 and accompanying text for a discussion of the protective
provision of the RLA. Section 8(d) of the NLRA (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1976)) provides:
[T]he duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such
contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desir-
ing such termination or modification: (1) serves a written notice upon
the other party to the contract . . . ; (2) offers to meet and confer with
the other party for the purpose of negotiating a new contract or a con-
tract containing the proposed modifications; (3) notifies the Federal Me-
diation and Conciliation Service. . . [and] . . . any State or Territorial
agency established to mediate and conciliate disputes. . . ; (4) continues
in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the
terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days
after such notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract,
whichever occurs later . . . . [Tihe duties so imposed shall not be con-
strued as requiring either party to discuss or agree to any modification of
the terms and conditons contained in a contract for a fixed period, if
such modification is to become effective before such terms and condi-
tions can be reopened under the provisions of the contract.
Id
Bi/disco, 682 F.2d at 79.
Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678, 687 (1966); Meyer v. Commissioner, 383
F.2d 883, 890 (8th Cir. 1967); In re Penn Fruit Co., 92 L.R.R.M. 3548 (E.D. Pa. 1976);
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977),reprtedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5963, 6179.
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Bankruptcy Code's reorganization procedures primarily seek
to protect three interests: (1) the debtor's interest in continu-
ing operation; (2) the employee's interest in remaining em-
ployed; and (3) the creditor's interest in repayment.15
Clearly, to the extent that Chapter 11 facilitates continued
business operations and employment opportunities, the goals
of the Bankruptcy Code and federal labor laws are
compatible. 15
3
The conflict in bankruptcy and labor policies arises princi-
pally from changes in terms and conditions of employment
under reorganization and in the union's ability to act as the
employee's agent for collective bargaining.'54 Since rejection
of a collective bargaining agreement by a debtor in possession
is a unilateral act, many urge that such rejection violates the
RLA and LMRA. 155 Courts that have addressed the inter-
play between federal labor law and the Bankruptcy Code
have tried to accomodate the interests of employees both in
continued employment and in retention of contractual terms
and conditions of employment. 1
56
C. Judcial Standards Governing Rejecti'on of Collective Bargaining
Agreements
The legal standard to be employed by the courts in accom-
modating the often conflicting interests of bankruptcy and la-
bor law has been the subject of considerable debate and
152 See generaly H.R.REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977), reprntedin 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963.
'" See supra text accompanying note 151. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6179.
,rI See generally, Bordewick & Cantryman, The Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments by Chapter 11 Debtors, 57 AM. BANKR L.J. 293 (1983).
'1.1 See Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 720, enforced, 602 F.2d 1302
(9th Cir. 1979). In Los Angeles Marine Hardware, the court affirmed the Board's holding
that an employer cannot alter mandatory terms during the effective period of a con-
tract without consent of the union, and that repudiation of mandatory contractual
terms without the union's consent during the term of the contract is not excused be-
cause the employer acted in good faith or was motivated solely by economic necessity.
Id at 1307.
11 See infra text accompanying notes 157-171.
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commentary.157 The debate, at least from a judicial perspec-
tive, was resolved in 1984 by the Supreme Court's decision in
NLRB v. Bildsco & Bildisco .158 The high court granted certio-
rari to resolve a conflict among the circuit courts over the
appropriate standard for Chapter 11 rejection of a labor con-
tract. 159 Initially, the Bi'ldisco Court held that collective bar-
gaining agreements are executory contracts subject to the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 160  The Court reasoned
that any inference that all labor contracts are exempt from
scrutiny under the Bankruptcy laws is rebutted by section
1167 of the Code, 16 1 which expressly exempts contracts nego-
tiated under the Railway Labor Act. 162
1,,' See genera/ly Simon, supra note 138; Comment, supra note 142; Note, supra note
147.
- 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
1,1 The Third Circuit in In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3rd Cir. 1982), cert. granted sub.
nom. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 103 S. Ct. 784 (1983), adopted the "balancing of
equities" test utilized by the Second Circuit in Shopman's Local Union No. 455 v.
Kevin Steel Prod., Inc., 519 F.2d 698 (2nd Cir. 1975). In Kevin Steel the court required
a thorough scrutiny and careful balancing of the competing equities between the
debtor employer and the creditor union before rejection of the labor contract could be
permitted. This standard was adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in In re Brada-Miller
Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890 (1 1th Cir. 1983). By contrast, the Second Circuit in Broth-
erhood of Ry. Employees v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1019 (1975), adopted a strict standard requiring a debtor in possession to demon-
strate that its reorganization will fail unless rejection of the union contract is permit-
ted.
In the context of airline bankruptcy, the standard governing rejection of a collective
bargaining agreement by a bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession was also dis-
cussed in In re Braniff Airways, 25 Bankr. 216, 218-19 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982). There
the Bankruptcy Court held that evidence that Braniff's IAM contract was burdensome
to the Braniff estate and that rejection of the contract would assist Braniff's organiza-
tion was sufficient grounds for challenging the labor contract. Id at 220-21. Before
rejecting the contract, however, the court held it necessary to balance the employee
claims that would arise from rejection by giving consideration to the employees' "abil-
ity to convert intangible rights into liquidated amounts, the claims of all other credi-
tors, the rights of the employees in the context of our national labor policy, the
sacrifices being made by others, and the preservation'of jobs." Id at 219. Based on
substantial evidence of Braniffs dire financial straits, difficulty in restructuring the
debt, and the possibility that it could not resume operations if labor costs were not
reduced, Braniff was allowed to reject its labor contract with the IAM. Id at 221.
Bldisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1194-95.
S11 U.S.C. § 1167 (Supp. III 1979).
162 Bi/disco, 104 S. Ct. at 1194-95. See supra text accompanying notes 132-141. The
Court's dicta suggests that both railway and airline labor contracts are encompassed
by the § 1167 exemption. In fact, section 1167 is exclusively a railroad provision and
does not apply to airlines.
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Turning to the standard governing bankruptcy rejection of
collective bargaining agreements, the Court unanimously af-
firmed the Third Circuit determination that rejection is
proper if it is determined that the contract burdens the estate
and that the equities balance in favor of rejection.'63 Factors
included in the balancing of equities include "the likelihood
and consequences of liquidation for the debtor absent rejec-
tion, the reduced value of the creditor's claims that would
follow from affirmance and the hardship that would have on
[the creditors], and the impact of rejection on employees. 1 64
The Court emphasized that before acting on a petition to re-
ject or modify a labor contract, the Bankruptcy Court should
be persuaded that reasonable efforts to negotiate a voluntary
modification have been made and are not likely to produce a
prompt and satisfactory solution. 6 5 The Supreme Court ex-
pressly rejected the stringent test formulated in Brotherhood of
Railway and Airline Clerks v. REA Express, Inc. ,166 which condi-
tioned rejection of a labor contract on a showing that survival
of the business hinges on rejection. 67
A more difficult issue for the Supreme Court was whether a
debtor in possession violates sections 8(d) and 8(a)(5) of the
LMRA 168 by unilaterally rejecting or modifying 69 a collec-
tive bargaining agreement before receiving formal approval
from the Bankruptcy Court. Justice Rehnquist, writing for a
5-member majority, declared that the National Labor Rela-
': Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1196. The Supreme Court expressed agreement with the
test applied by the Second Circuit in Shopman's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel
Prod., Inc., 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975) and the Eleventh Circuit decision in In re
Brada-Miller Freight System, 702 F.2d 919 (1 1th Cir. 1983). Bi/disco, 104 S. Ct. at
1196.
, , 104 S. Ct. at 1197.
", Id at 1196-97. For the text of Section 8(d) of the LMRA 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d)(1976), see supra note 149. Section 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) provides that
it is an unfair labor practice "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees. ... Id.
523 F.2d 164, 167-69 (2d Cir.), cert. dened, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975).
Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1195.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
, Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1199. Although the Court used the word "modify," it is not
clear whether Chapter 11 enables a debtor in possession to unilaterally revise a con-
tract, as opposed to rejecting it outright.
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tions Board is precluded from applying section 8(d) to a
debtor in possession since the practical effect of such action
would be to require adherence to the terms of the contract. 7 '
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that this holding under-
mines the National Labor Relations Act policy of protecting
labor negotiations,' 7 ' but explained that this decision does
not relieve the debtor of all its obligations under federal labor
law. To the contrary, the debtor in possession remains an
"employer" within the meaning of the Act, and must bargain
with the union about any new contract.' 72
D. Propriety of A'rlne Bankruptcy as an Approach to Reducing
Airhne Labor Costs.
The rejection of a collective bargaining agreement is an ex-
treme approach to reducing labor costs and should be under-
taken only in extraordinary economic circumstances. Most
courts consider mid-term cancellation of a collective bargain-
ing agreement a violation of the letter and spirit of federal
labor law, and for this reason, bankruptcy courts must care-
fully scrutinize any petition seeking rejection of a collective
bargaining agreement. Nevertheless, unions representing em-
ployees of financially troubled carriers must recognize the im-
portance of helping a troubled carrier back to profitability
SId
,7 Id. at 1200-01.
,72 Id at 1201. Justice Brennan, writing for the 4-member minority, emphasized
that there was no provision in the Bankruptcy Code permitting an employer to violate
sections 8(d) and 8(a)(5). Id. at 1201, 1203 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). Allowing a debtor in possession to unilaterally reject a labor contract,
in Justice Brennan's view, fails to accommodate the goals of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act and gives unwarranted importance to the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.
Id. at 1208-09. Finally, the minority reasoned that section 8(d) would require adher-
ence to the labor contract only until the Bankruptcy Court gives permission to reject,
and that in extreme cases most unions will give concessions necessary to keep the em-
ployer in business. Id at 1210. Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined in
Justice Brennan's opinion.
In the aftermath of the Bdldico decision, the House of Representatives passed House
Bill 5174 which would overrule .8:dico by conditioning rejection of a labor contract on
a showing that continued obligations under the contract will force the employer out of
business. Bankruptcy reform legislation that would overrule Bildisco is currently meet-
ing resistance in the Senate. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 63, Apr. 2, 1984, at A8.
1984]
532 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
and agree to contract modifications necessary to insure suc-
cessful reorganization.
III. UNION CONCESSIONS IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Bankruptcy and double-breasting are extreme responses to
competitive pressures in the deregulated airline industry and
clearly are not appropriate for all major carriers. Unions rep-
resenting airline employees' 73 also have an interest in the fi-
nancial health of the major carriers and are in a position to
assist in reducing labor costs. Given the relatively high wages
negotiated by airlines and unions during the years of regula-
tion, as well as cumbersome restrictions on workforce man-
agement, the most obvious means for reducing airline labor
costs is through collective bargaining. In fact, most airlines
have benefited from union concessions since deregulation,
and for the most part, these concessions have been obtained
without having to survive a strike.'74 This section will discuss
two significant labor-management agreements intended to re-
duce airline labor costs and will conclude with a summary of
actual airline-union contractual settlements during the past
two years.
A. Union Consent to Two Pilot Crews
The first major union concession to airlines after deregula-
, Several large unions represent the employees in various crafts and classes in the
major airlines. The largest union representing pilots is the Air Line Pilots Association
(ALPA). Pilots of American Airlines are represented by the Allied Pilots Association
(APA). Ground service employees and mechanics are primarily represented by the
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM), the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters (Teamsters), and the Transport Workers Union
(TWU). The larger unions representing flight attendants include the TWU, the In-
dependent Union of Flight Attendants (IUFA), the Independant Federation of Flight
Attendants (IFFA), and the association of Professional Flight Attendants (APFA). The
TWU also represents a large segment of the industry's baggage handlers, as does the
Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks (BRAC). Finally, ticket and
reservation agents and office personnel are represented by the Airline Employees Asso-
ciation (ALEA) at many airlines. The foregoing clearly is not an exhaustive list of the
unions involved in representation of airline employees.
"" See 48 NMB ANN. REP. 20 (1982). Despite a large number of contract renewal
negotiations in 1982, fewer strikes were called against airlines in 1982 than in any year
since 1966. Id
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tion involved the number of pilots required to operate the
prevalent Boeing 737 and McDonnell-Douglas DC-9 air-
craft. 75 Although the FAA certified these aircraft for two pi-
lot crews in the early 1960's, 176  ALPA was sucessful in
reaching agreements requiring three pilot crews with most
major carriers. Pilots are the highest paid unionized employ-
ees in the airline industry and it is very costly to operate com-
mercial aircraft with three pilots. 177  During contract
negotiations in 1969, United Airlines and ALPA reached a
stalemate on pilot crew size and eventually agreed to submit
the issue to arbitration.' 8  To the surprise of United, 79 the
three member arbitration panel 80 determined that United's
fleet of 737's could not be safely operated without three pilot
crews and, therefore, ruled for the union.' 81 During the
1970's, most airlines continued to use three pilot crews in
large commercial aircraft.
The issue of pilot crew size resurfaced in 1979 when ALPA
members at Wien Air Alaska went on strike over a variety of
bargaining subjects, including union insistence on three pilot
,71 Other aircraft that have been the focus of the two pilot crew size debate in recent
years include the Boeing 757 and 767, McDonnell-Douglas DC-9 "Super 80" and the
Airbus Industries A-310. The Boeing 727 and 747 and the McDonnell-Douglas DC-10
have uniformly been operated with three pilot crews. The precise issue concerning
medium size commercial jets such as the Boeing 737 is whether the third cock pit crew
member must be a pilot, or whether a non-pilot flight engineer can fill the third seat.
For an excellent discussion of the crew size issue, see Northrup, The New Employee Rela-
tions Climate in Airlines, 36 INDUS. AND LAB. REL. REV. 167 (1983).
. O'lone, Evaluation Plan May Decide 737 Crew, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Dec. 18,
1967, at 32.
- See Weisner, The Pubhc Wins One, FORBES, Dec. 8, 1980, at 33-34. ALPA natu-
rally wants to maximize available work for pilots and also is interested in assuring
maximum flight hours for pilots who must fly in order to keep their license. See
Northurp, supra note 175, at 171.
- 737 Flight Crew Ruling Could Have Broader Appliations, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH.,
Apr. 6, 1970, at 38.
-7 Professor Northrup reported that United consented to arbitration merely as an
appeasement to ALPA, so the union could find an honorable way to escape its assist-
ance on three pilot crews and still reach an agreement with United. See Northrup,
supra note 175, at 171 n.17.
- Arbitrators Silvester Garrett, Charles Killingsworth, and Arthur Ross made up
the arbitration panel.
- The unreported arbitration decision was rendered in April, 1970. See 737Fight
Crew Rulig Could Have Broader Applications, supra note 178.
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crews for most of the airline's fleet.' The strike persisted for
several months as striking Wien pilots received ALPA strike
benefits equaling their full salary. Pursuant to section 44 of
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,"a3 however, President
Carter appointed an emergency board in November, 1978, to
make recommendations for settlement of the ALPA strike
against Wien.' 4 Early in 1979 the three-person emergency
board 85 recommended that Wien's 737's be flown with two
pilot crews. Subsequently, ALPA consented to two pilot
crews at Wien when the airline agreed to increase pilot sala-
ries and give displaced pilots first claim on job openings. ' 6
The Wien-ALPA strike settlement in March, 1979, did not
end the crew size controversy. Despite its agreement to use
two pilot crews in Wien Air Alaska's 737 aircraft, the union
threatened a one day nationwide strike on March 2, 1981, to
protest the FAA's certification of the McDonnell-Douglas
DC9-80 for two pilot crews. 18 7 Again, a presidential taskforce
was established to analyze the crew size issue.'88 In July,
1981, the taskforce announced its conclusion that the new
line of Boeing 757 and 767 planes and the McDonnell-Doug-
las DC9 "Super 80" could safely be operated with two pilot
crews.'89 ALPA accepted the task force conclusions and most
737, 757, 767 and DC9-80 aircraft are now operated with two
182 45 NMB ANN. REP. 28-29 (1979).
18:1 Section 44 of the Airline Deregulation Act, 92 Stat. 1753, directed the President
to establish an emergency board to assist in resolution of the ALPA strike against Wien
Air Alaska.
,i Section 10 of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1976), empowers the president to estab-
lish an emergency board upon notification from the NMB that a labor dispute threat-
ens "[s]ubstantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any
section of the country of essential transportation service." The NMB determined that
the Wien Air Alaska strike did not threaten interruption of essential transportaion serv-
ices and did not recommend the creation of an emergency board to the President. See
45 NMB ANN. REP. 28-29 (1979). Section 44 of the Airline Deregulation Act effec-
tively overruled the NMB's decision not to recommend emergency board procedures to
President Carter.
I"5 The emergency board appointed by President Carter included Paul N. Guthrie,
Ralph W. Yarborough, and Lawrence E. Siebel.
', 45 NMB ANN. REP. 28-29 (1979).
" Wall St. J., July 6, 1981, at 7, col. 3.
'I8 North, Presidential Panel Starts Crew Complement Study, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH.,
Apr. 13, 1981, at 36.
- 47 NMB ANN. REP. 8 (1981).
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pilot crews.'9o
B. Two- Ter Wage Structure
ALPA assent to two pilot crews in the 737 and DC9-80
aircraft has benefited many major carriers in recent years,
but further reduction in labor costs for unionized air carriers
has depended on success in collective bargaining by individ-
ual carriers. One of the more imaginative plans for reducing
overall labor costs was negotiated by American Airlines and
the Transport Workers Union (TWU) in March, 1982.
American's contract with the TWU retains relatively high
salaries and favorable working conditions for its 10,500 cur-
rent employees that belong to the TWU, but allows the com-
pany to set salaries for new employees that are competitive
with newer non-union carriers such as Southwest, Muse, and
People Express.19' On November 7, 1983, American's 4,000
pilots agreed to a similar plan,1 92 as did its 6,000 flight at-
tendants in December, 1983.193
This "two-tier" wage structure is intended to gradually re-
duce American's overall labor costs without having to estab-
lish an all new airline or ask for sacrifices by current
employees.' 94 While lower overall labor costs undoubtedly
- United Air Lines' longstanding dispute with ALPA over pilot crew size for its
large fleet of 737's was resolved in favor of the airline in June, 1981, when the ALPA
chapter at United voted in favor of two pilot crews. The United pilots' assent to two
pilot crews may be attributed to concern over United's competition from non-union
carriers, such as Midway and New York Air. Significantly, the United-ALPA contract
negotiated in 1981 included an agreement by the airline not to establish a non-union
subsidiary or affiliate carrier. See Northurp, supra note 175, at 174. See also supra text
accompanying notes 122-125 for a general discussion of "New York Air" clauses.
- What Labor Gave American Airlines, Bus. WEEK, March 21, 1983, at 33. Dallas
Morning News, Nov. 20, 1983, at 1H, col. 3. At the time of this writing, Western
Airlines was also considering proposing a two-tier wage plan to the unions representing
its employees. Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
192 Dallas Morning News, Nov. 20, 1983, at 1H, col. 3; Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
217, Nov. 8, 1983, at A-7.
I%' Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 250, Dec. 28, 1983, at A-3. Northwest Airlines and
the union representing its flight attendants reached agreement on a two-tiered wage
plan in April 1984. See note 262 infia and accompanying text. United Airlines and its
flight attendants agree to a two-tier wage plan in March 1984. See note 279 in/fa and
accompanying text.
-9 Dallas Morning News, Nov. 20, 1983, at 1H, col. 3. An indication of the cost
savings American hopes to realize as its two-tier wage structure unfolds is illustrated by
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will result from prolonged use of a two-tier wage system, some
commentators predict long range morale problems as a sizea-
ble force of second-tier employees become resentful toward
their higher paid co-workers who perform identical tasks. 9 '
One commentator succinctly explained the weakness of two-
tier wage systems to be that "when you are starving, you eat
anything you can, human nature being what it is. But when
you are not starving any more, you start looking around at
what other people are eating. ' '1 96
In addition to speculation about the long range effective-
ness of two-tier plans, there is concern over potential legal
problems as two-tier plans mature. 197 First, new employees
who are dissatisfied with their pay rates may challenge the
two-tier system as a breach of union duty to fairly represent
the interests of all employees. 98 Second, new employees be-
longing to minority groups that have been underrepresented
in the employer's workforce or in particular job catagories
may challenge the two-tiered system as discriminatory.' 99
comparison of its costs per available seat mile (ASM) with that of some of American's
non-union competition. In November, 1983, American's cost per ASM was 8.14 cents.
By contrast, Dallas based Southwest Airlines' and Muse Airlines' respective costs per
ASM were only 5.99 cents and 5.24 cents. Id. For additional comparison airline costs,
see That Daring Young Man and His Flying Machine, INC., Jan., 1984, at 42, 46.
I- See Comments of Professor Peter Cappelli and labor economist Sar Levitan in
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 244, Dec. 19, 1983, at C-i.
- Id. (quoting Graef Crystal of Tower, Perrin, Foster and Crosby). It must be em-
phasized that the long range effect of two-tier wage plans has never been scientifically
studied or determined. In the case of American Airlines, however, some important
considerations increase the probability of success. First, the enormous size of Ameri-
can's work force removes the degree of resentfulness that would be felt among new
employees in a smaller work place who arguably are more stigmatized by lower pay for
identical work. Secondly, the disparity in compensation rates among carriers in the
airline industry clearly supplies a legitimate reason for adoption of two-tier wage plan
by American. Third, many employees who will be hired at lower salaries by American
will be individuals who were furloughed or discharged by financially troubled airlines
and, at least initially, will view employment at lower rates of pay as better than no
employment at all.
- See Comments of Professor Clyde Summers in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 244,
Dec. 19, 1983, at C-1.
"a One airline executive interviewed by the author referred to this as the "rights of
the unborn" issue. See infra text accompanying notes 200-225 for a discussion of the
duty of fair representation.
' See i'n/Ta text accompanying notes 226-237 for a discussion of employment
discrimination.
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1. Duty of Fair Representation
Unions owe a duty of fair representation (DFR) to all em-
ployees they represent. 00 A necessary premise to the argu-
ment that two-tier wage plans are inconsistent with a union's
DFR is that the DFR is owed to future employees.20 ' No
court has held that a union must consider the interests of fu-
ture employees when negotiating a labor contract, but there
is some authority supporting the claim that future employees
are protected by the DFR. First, courts have uniformly held
that a union breaches its DFR by negotiating a contract pro-
vision that discriminates against employees belonging to pro-
tected minority groups.20 2  Discriminatory contract
provisions, such as a contract provision locking a dispropor-
tionately large group of minority employees into lower pay-
ing job classifications,20 3 clearly may have a prospective
effect and harm the interests of future employees. In Bell &
Howell v. NLRB, °4 the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals stated that the DFR is breached by union involvement
in negotiation of a contract clause that discriminates against
employees or "potential employees" on account of race or
The duty of fair representation under the RLA is derived from RLA, § 2, Fourth,
45 U.S.C. § 152 (1976), which vests unions enjoying majority support in a bargaining
unit with the right to exclusively represent employees in that unit. See Steele v. Louis-
ville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). The duty of fair representation proscribes arbi-
trary or perfunctory conduct by a union in negotiating, administering, or enforcing a
labor contract. See Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983) (under
NLRA); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 439 U.S. 892 (1979) (under
NLRA); Harrison v. Union Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 425 U.S.
958 (1975) (under RLA). For a thorough discussion of the standards governing union
exercise of the duty of fair representation, see Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation: A
Theoretical Structure, 51 TEX. L. REV. 1119 (1973).
-1 In the contract negotiation context, the duty of fair representation is generally
explained as requiring the union to protect the collective interests of all bargaining
unit employees. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342 (1964); Smith v. Huffman
Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229, 1235-36 (8th Cir. 1980).
2 Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992 (11 th Cir. 1982); Farmer v.
A.R.A. Services, Co., 660 F.2d 1096 (8th Cir. 1981); Sears v. Bennett, 645 F.2d 1365
(10th Cir. 1981); Dickinson v. United States Steel Corp., 439 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Penn.
1977), vacated in part on other grounds, 616 F.2d 698 (3rd Cir. 1980).
o' See, e.g., Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992, 1017-18 (1 1th Cir.
1982).
598 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 942 (1979).
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sex.
205
Aside from cases involving invidious discrimination against
minorities, the strongest authority supporting extension of the
DFR to future employees is the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decision in Jones v. Trans World Airines .206 The dispute
in TWA involved a clause agreed to by TWA and the Interna-
tional Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
(IAM) in contract renewal negotiations in 1970. This clause
defined seniority as length of service in a position that was
included in the bargaining unit covered by the agreement. °7
The TWA bargaining unit represented by the IAM included
guards, but historically had not included passenger relations
agents.218  Plaintiffs in TWA were a group of passenger rela-
tions agents who lost their seniority, in relation to guards,
when the bargaining unit represented by IAM was expanded
to include passenger relations agents in 1970.209 Despite the
seniority clause's distinction based on union membership and
length of inclusion in the bargaining unit, the district court
held that the seniority clause was not a product of unfair rep-
resentation.210 Specifically, the court held that no duty was
owed to plaintiffs since they were not bargaining unit mem-
- Id. at 147.
21; 495 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1974).
2o, Id. at 794.
2- Id. at 793.
- Id at 795. The Second Circuit did not explain how passenger relations agents
came to be included in the bargaining unit. Id In the 1970 negotiations, the IAM and
TWA agreed to an expanded definition of the bargaining unit to include passenger
relations agents. As the court pointed out, however, RLA, § 2, Fourth, 45 U.S.C. § 152
(1976), guarantees majority free choice concerning union representation. TWA, 495
F.2d at 797. An agreement between a union and employer clearly could not bind
passenger relations agents to inclusion in the bargaining unit. Presumably, the Second
Circuit considered the passenger relations agents an accretion to the guard unit, but
there is no discussion of this by the court. As generally applied, the accretion doctrine
provides for automatic extension of union representation rights to new employees join-
ing a pre-existing bargaining unit so long as there is no objective evidence that the
union has lost majority support. See generally C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW 37 (2d Ed. 1983). Moreover, the NMB never specifically certified the bargaining
unit to include passenger relations agents and there is no indication that passenger
relations agents were given an opportunity to participate in an NMB conducted elec-
tion. TWA, 495 F.2d at 793.
- 495 F.2d at 792-93.
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bers when the contract was negotiated.2 ' In reversing this
decision, the Second Circuit held this basis of distinction to
be overly broad. The court stated:
[I]t is clear that a union may conduct itself in a manner so
arbitrary or malicious vis-a-vis an outside group that it ex-
ceeds the limit imposed by the duty of fair representation
... .Thus, the district court gave the duty of fair representa-
tion too narrow a scope when it assumed that in no circum-
stance did the IAM have a duty not to discriminate against
non-unit members.212
Although TWA and Bell & Howell indicate that a union's
DFR may extend to future employees, 21 3 union liability 214
for agreeing to a two tier wage system also requires evidence
that the union's conduct was arbitrary or in bad faith neglect
of the interest of future employees. 2 5 A 1981 decision by the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, Johnson v. Airline Pilots In the
Service of Northwest Airlines, 216 illustrates the burden employ-
ees must satisfy to show that differential treatment under a
labor contract is the result of unfair union representation.
211 Id
212 Id at 796-97.
2,: Another case indicating that the DFR protects future employees is Emmanuel v.
Omaha Carpenters Dist. Council, 560 F.2d 382 (8th Cir. 1977). There, an agreement
between a union business agent and contractor limiting the contractor's right to hire
from outside the union hiring hall was declared a product of unfair union representa-
tion. Id at 385. In addition to violating the applicable collective bargaining agree-
ment, the court held that the side agreement between the business agent and
contractor unreasonably restrained the employment opportunities of experienced
carpenters who otherwise would have been called directly by the employer. Accord-
ingly, the court held the side agreement was a breach of duty of fair representation. Id
" Id The duty of fair representation is a statutory obligation arising from the
union's status as exclusive bargaining representative. See supra note 200. Section 301 of
the Labor Mangement Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976), enables employees to sue
an employer for breach of a labor contract in particular circumstances, but an em-
ployer clearly does not owe a duty to employees not to agree to a contract provision
that is injurious to employees, so long as the provision is not otherwise unlawful.
2 1! Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983); International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers v. Foust, 439 U.S. 892 (1979); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424
U.S. 554 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). The DFR is frequently interpreted
to preclude discriminatory union conduct, but only when the discrimination is invidi-
ous or the union's conduct is hostile to a particular group. See, e.g., William v. Pacific
Maritime Ass'n, 617 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1980); Goclowski v. Penn Central Transp. Co.,
571 F.2d 747 (3rd Cir. 1977).
2, 650 F.2d 133 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1063 (1981).
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Plaintiffs in Johnson were former Northwest pilots who were
furloughed in 1970 and never recalled. 217 Although the con-
tract in existence when plaintiffs were furloughed in 1970
preserved the pilots' seniority and recall rights for only five
years, a 1975 Letter of Understanding extended plaintiffs'
seniority and recall rights until June 30, 1978. In April, 1978,
recall notices were sent to 20 pilots, but the recall notices
were soon cancelled by the airline when the pilots union
called a strike against the airline on April 29, 1978.2 18 A new
agreement was executed by Northwest and the pilots union
on August 15, 1978, but it did not extend the seniority and
recall rights of laid-off employees.
21 9
Plaintiffs alleged two separate breaches of the union's
DFR. First, plaintiffs challenged the union's decision to
strike at a time when the airline was recalling laid off pilots
and the pilots' seniority was about to expire. Second, plain-
tiffs alleged that the union did not make a fair effort to pre-
serve seniority and recall rights during 1978 contract
negotiations.22°
The union was awarded summary judgment on both
claims of unfair representation.22 ' In affirming the award of
summary judgment, the Eighth Circuit emphasized that
there was no evidence that the April 29, 1978, strike was
called in bad faith or to undermine plaintiffs' recall opportu-
nities.222 The court held that union knowledge that the air-
line was recalling many laid off employees to work and that
their seniority would soon expire if they were not soon re-
turned to work did not provide an adequate basis for infer-
ring that the strike was called arbitrarily or in bad faith.223
The union's failure to protect plaintiffs' seniority rights in
2,, Id at 134.
2,8 Id. at 135. The 1975 labor contract became "amendable" on July 1, 1977. Nego-
tiations toward a new contract began in April of 1977 and continued for approxi-
mately one year before the strike was called on April 29, 1978. Id.
219 Id
22 Id at 136.
221 Johnson v. Airline Pilots Ass'n of Northwest Airlines, No. 4-79-238, slip op. (D.
Minn. 1979).
222 650 F.2d at 136-37.
223 Id.
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contract negotiations was also condoned by the court. When
contract negotiations involve competing interests among
groups of bargaining unit employees, the court indicated that
a union enjoys broad discretion to determine the best inter-
ests of the overall bargaining unit. It stated:
Where a union must negotiate meritorious but conflicting
claims, "and no clear showing has been made of bad faith in
making a choice between [two or more] claims, it cannot be
said that in making the choice it made, the union unfairly
represented one group."2
24
Applying this standard, theJohnson court held that the pilots
union fairly relinquished the recall rights of laid-off employ-
ees in order to reach a contract beneficial to working pilots.
2 25
Thus, even if a union's DFR extends to future employees, a
union has a great deal of discretion in balancing the interests
of current employees against the interests of future employ-
ees. In the airline industry, where companies have widely va-
rying labor costs and consistent profitability is elusive, a
union's DFR clearly does not constrain implementation of a
two-tier wage plan. On the other hand, in companies with
significant underrepresentation of protected minorities in af-
fected job categories, potential liability should discourage
both the union and employer from agreeing to compensation
of future employees at rates lower than current employees.
2. Employment Discrimznaton.
A universally recognized means of proving unlawful dis-
crimination under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964226
and section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866227 is by evi-
dence that an employment policy or practice disporportion-
ately harms a protected minority.228 Employees hired after
implementation of a two-tier wage plan may contend that
22. Id at 137 (quoting Bucholtz v. Swift & Co., 609 F.2d 317, 327, (8th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018 (1980)).
225 Id
26 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
227 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
28 See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
80-205 (2d ed. 1983).
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they are receiving lower rates of pay than other employees on
account of their race, national origin, sex or other minority
group status.22 9 If workforce statistics substantiate that the
relevant minority group was underrepresented prior to im-
plementation of the two-tier wage plan, both the employer
and union 30 conceivably could be found to have unlawfully
discriminated against the minority employees hired at lower
rates.
A recent Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Jack-
son v. Seaboard Coasth'ne R.R. Co. ,231 exemplifies the disparate
impact theory of employment discrimination in the context
of collective bargaining. The plaintiffs in Seaboard, black car-
men helpers employed by the railroad company, contended
that the union unlawfully discriminated against them by ne-
gotiating a contract provision that locked them into lower
paying jobs.232 The bargaining unit involved in Seaboard was
composed of employees in four job categories: carmen, car-
men apprentices, helper apprentices, and carmen helpers.
Carmen were the highest paid employees in the bargaining
unit and the position of carmen apprentices and helper ap-
prentices enabled employees to automatically progress to the
carmen position.233 By contrast, the carmen helper position,
which was composed entirely of black employees, did not pro-
- Applicability of the disparate impact theory of discrimination is not well estab-
lished under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-
634 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). In Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981), the court held that age discrimination may be proved by
evidence of disparate impact, but other courts have expressed concern over this form of
proof in age cases on grounds that age is a progressive condition that does not lend
itself to broad-based statistical comparisions. See, e.g., Williams v. City & County of
San Francisco, 483 F. Supp. 335 (N.D. Ca. 1979). Other courts have reasoned that
disparate impact analysis is inappropriate in age cases since motive and intent are
more important factors than in other discrimination cases. See, e.g., Kephart v. Insti-
tute of Gas Tech., 630 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
M3 A union, as well as employer, may be held liable for backpay in actions under
title VII and section 1981. Union liability for backpay and actions under the Age
Discrimination and Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. III 1979),
and Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976), has not been established. See generally
Jansonius, Allocation of Backpay Liabifiy for Violation of Employee Rights, 36 OKLA. L. REV.
745 (1983).
-, 678 F. 2d 992 (1 th Cir. 1982).
22 Id at 997.
2- Id at 996-97.
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vide for automatic progression and effectively restricted black
employees to lower paying positions. 234 After determining
that the railroad had historically discriminated in hiring by
placing black applicants only into lower paying job catego-
ries, the district court entered judgment against the union on
grounds that the collective bargaining agreement perpetu-
ated the employer's discriminatory hiring practices by limit-
ing promotional opportunities of employees in the lower
paying job classifications.235 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the judgment and award of back-pay liability against the
236union.
Seaboard illustrates that a union and as well as an employer,
may be held liable for negotiating a collective bargaining
agreement that has a disparate impact on minority employ-
ees, even if the disparate impact is traceable to the employer's
discrimination in hiring.237 Accordingly, a two-tier wage
plan is troublesome to the extent that the employer's
workforce is underrepresented by certain protected minority
groups at the time the two-tier wage plan is implemented.
The extent of this problem is a matter that can only be deter-
mined on a company-by-company basis at the time a two-tier
wage plan is being considered.
C. Concesstion Bargatz'nng
Two trademarks of collective bargaining in the airline in-
dustry prior to 1978 were continually higher wages and sala-
ries for airline employees and relative uniformity in contracts
negotiatied by major carriers. Post-deregulation collective
bargaining has not resulted in lower labor costs for every ma-
jor carrier, but the predictability of higher wages and salaries
has, at least in recent years, been shattered. In the following
pages, the dynamics of contemporary collective bargaining in
the airline industry will be illustrated by a summary of con-
2:1 Id at 996-98.
Id. at 997-98.
Id at 1016.
" See also Farmer v. ARA Servs., 660 F.2d 1096 (6th Cir. 1981); Tooley v. Martin-
Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1981); Sears v. Atchison, Topeka, & S.F. Ry.,
645 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1981).
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tracts negotiated by major carriers in recent years.238
1. American A'rhnes
American's two-tier wage plan, discussed earlier,2 31 is
among the most novel contract provisions negotiated by an
airline either before or after deregulation. At the same time
that American's flight attendants agreed to this plan, they
also agreed to higher health care plan deductibles and incen-
tives for early retirement.24 ° Wages for flight attendants were
increased by six per cent effective retroactive to March 2,
1983, with additional four per cent increases scheduled for
July, 1984, and August, 1985.241 The agreement includes an
increased hours guarantee and restrictions on part time work.
American's 1983 contract with the Allied Pilots Association
does not include any work hour changes,242 but the pilots did
agree to forego scheduled wage increases. Instead of receiv-
ing a seven per cent increase in November, 1983, as planned,
the pilots will receive a three per cent raise in March of 1984.
The pilots also agreed to an increase in their health care plan
deductibles, contingent upon an increase in the consumer
price index beyond a specified level. In exchange for the pi-
lots' concessions on these fixed costs, the airline has agreed to
establish a profit sharing plan.243
In contrast to its agreement with the flight attendants and
pilots, American's 1983 agreement with the TWU grants sig-
nificant flexibility to the company in using part time employ-
ees and cross-utilizing employees.244 The union's concessions
-"' For a discussion of the dynamics of concession bargaining, see Levine & Leven-
good, Producttvity and Wage Concessions: Current Bargaining Issues for US At'irines, 9 EM-
PLOYEE REL. L.J. 308 (1983). See also 107 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 36 (Jan, 1983).
1:11 See supra notes 192-199 and accompanying text.
240 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 250, Dec. 28, 1983, at A-3.
241 Id
242 Id
24:1 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 217, Nov. 8, 1983, at A-7.
'44 Greater flexibility in work scheduling and job assignments are a common theme
in airline concession bargaining. Considering the considerable flexibility in work force
management enjoyed by non-union carriers and the fact that union concessions on job
assignments and scheduling do not require a decrease in take home pay, this is a partic-
ularly attractive source for lowering airline labor costs. To the extent that flexible
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to management rights in directing the work force are bal-
anced by a 21.4 per cent pay increase for mechanics and
ground service workers over the three years of the contract,
guaranteed employment during the life of the contract, and
pension supplements to employees who retire early.245 De-
spite the 21 per cent pay increase to current workers over the
three year term, American estimates that its current contract
with the TWU will result in an average annual five per cent
decrease in labor costs for TWU members during the term of
the contract. 46
2. Delta Airlines
Despite uncommonly poor financial performance in recent
years, Delta has continued to enjoy a very positive relation-
ship with its employees. 7 In 1982, Delta's 36,000 employees,
which are largely non-union, contributed some $30,000,000
to purchase a new airplane for the company. More recently,
corporate officers voluntarily reduced their compensation as
a result of the company's first loss in 36 years.
Delta's 3,811 pilots are the only major work group at Delta
represented by a union. In August of 1983, ALPA agreed to
an 18 month contract extension which includes a wage freeze
and allows Delta to assign overtime to pilots at only one loca-
tion. Previous rules had required overtime to be granted on a
system-wide basis. This change now allows the company
more flexibility in assigning overtime work to pilots. 248
3. Eastern Airhnes
Financially troubled Eastern Airlines experienced a most
unusual collective bargaining year in 1983. To avoid a
work scheduling interferes with stability of defined crafts and classes, however, unions
logically can be expected to object to this form of concession.
21r, What Labor Gave American Airlines, supra note 191, at 33-34.
2#6 Id This overall decrease in labor costs, if it materializes, will be a product of
flexibility in directing employees, the two-tiered wage program, and reduced benefits
costs.
24, Delta attributes its recent poor financial performance to the cost of acquiring a
large fleet of new 737 aircraft, not to excessive labor costs. Brigance, supra note 3 at 43.
248 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 156, Aug. 11, 1983, at A-8.
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threatened strike by IAM in April, 1983, the airline agreed
to a contract increasing wages of the airline's mechanics and
ground service workers by 21 per cent retroactive to January
1, 1983, with total increases of 32.4 per cent over the three
year span of the contract. 249 This controversial agreement
250
enabled the airline to avert a strike, but substantially in-
creased the airline's labor costs and pushed the airline further
into debt.
On the verge of bankruptcy later in 1983,251 Eastern was
successful in reaching agreements with IAM, TWU, and
ALPA on an agreement designed to substantially reduce the
airline's short term labor costs. This agreement requires
mechanics and flight attendants to give up 18 per cent of
their pay over a twelve month period and for pilots to sacri-
fice 22 per cent of their pay during the same period. 2 In
exchange for the concessions, Eastern will pay the employees
in stock, thereby turning over approximately 25 per cent of
company ownership to the employees within one year. East-
ern employees will also be able to select four persons to sit on
the company's 21 member board of directors.253
4. Frontier Airlines
Frontier's contracts with the Association of Flight Attend-
ants and Airline Employees Association became amendable
in May of 1982, and the parties are currently involved in con-
tract negotiations. 254 The airline has requested a 10 per cent
pay cut, as well as certain productivity concessions. So far,
the flight attendants union has rejected both of these re-
quests. On May 25, 1984, a voting majority of flight attend-
ants approved a strike if an agreement was not reached with
"I Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 70, Apr. 11, 1983, at A-4.
2- Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volker cited the Eastern-lAM agreement as one
of a number of large contract settlements considered by Mr. Volker to be a threat to
continued low inflation. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 72, Apr. 13, 1983, at A-3.
-1 Dallas Morning News, Dec. 9, 1983, at 4E, col. 4.
2- BNA-Collective Bargaining Negotiations & Contracts, Dec. 22, 1983, at 1.
-:, English, Companies Learn to Live with Unions in Board Rooms, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Jan. 30, 1984, at 63; BNA-Collective Bargaining Negotiations & Contracts, Dec.
22, 1983, at 1; Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 237, Dec. 8, 1983, at A-9.
254 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, Jan. 10, 1984, at A-7, A-8.
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Frontier by June 1, 1984.255 Frontier's contract with IAM be-
came amendable in December of 1983, and bargaining is cur-
rently underway.
Frontier's 700 pilots are represented by ALPA, whose con-
tract runs through May of 1985. In June, 1983, however,
ALPA negotiated a three per cent pay reduction for its 900
pilots over a fifteen month period and increased maximum
flying hours. More recently, the company and the union
have engaged in further contract negotiations but have de-
clined to specify the content of their dialogue.2 56
Frontier Horizon, a new non-union carrier set up by the
holding company that owns Frontier Airlines, began opera-
tions on January 9, 1984. Urging that it has damaged em-
ployee morale, threatened job security and violated existing
collective bargaining agreements, a coalition of unions repre-
senting employees at Frontier is challenging the carrier's deci-
sion to establish the non-union airline.257
5. Northwest Airines
In June, 1982, Northwest reached an agreement with the
IAM ending an approximately one month strike by the air-
line's mechanics, baggage handlers, food service workers and
security personnel. 25' The principal issue separating North-
west and the IAM was use of part time workers. The strike-
ending agreement provided union membership with wage in-
creases approximating 25 per cent over a 38-month period.
Northwest also dropped its proposal to hire part time work-
ers, and in turn, the Union consented to increased manage-
ment flexibility in assigning workers to a variety of jobs.259
More recently, in November, 1983, ALPA and Northwest
negotiated a three year contract that froze wages until Janu-
ary 1, 1984. Pilots received pay increases of 7.5 per cent on
that date, and will receive 6.5 per cent in 1985, and 3 per cent
" The Denver Post, May 26, 1984, at ID, col. 2.
2.Id
I, d See supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
2 48 NMB ANN. REP. 48-49 (1982).
SId
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in 1986.260 Under the November, 1983 contract, Northwest
pilots may be required to fly 83 hours per month as compared
to 75 hours per month under the expired contract.261
Northwest again narrowly averted a strike in April, 1984
by reaching a last minute agreement with its flight attend-
ants, represented by the Aerospace and Allied Employees Lo-
cal 2747. Under the new 3 year contract, flight attendants
hired after January 1, 1984, would be paid 30 per cent less
than the base rate for employees hired before that date.
Lower tier employees would advance to the higher pay rate
on their sixth anniversary of employment with Northwest.
The starting rate of pay under the new contract would be
$13,730 compared to the previous rate of $15,192. On July 1,
1985, the starting rate for flight attendants would increase to
$14,160. The new contract was ratified by union member-
ship in May, 1984.262
6. Pan American World Airways
For the most part, Pan Am's 1983 negotiations have dealt
with the extension of a 1981 pay cut of 10 per cent agreed to
by the Teamsters, TWU, and IUFA.263 Pursuant to the Pan
Am agreement with the Teamsters, covering clerical and
ground service workers, employee pay rates were increased to
95 per cent of the rates that prevailed before the 1981 wage
cuts, effective April 1, 1983.264 Employees were restored to
full rates on January 1, 1984, but a 25 cent per hour cost of
living adjustment scheduled for January, 1982, was deferred
another two years.265 Pan Am also agreed to establish a
profit sharing plan for Teamsters' covered employees. 266
Pan Am's mechanics and ground service employees, repre-
sented by the TWU, also were restored to 95 per cent of their
1981 pay levels pursuant to the 1983 contracts. TWU em-
- 106 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 72 (1983).
261 Id.
2 ,2 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 94, May 15, 1984, at A-2.
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ployees were fully restored to 1981 pay levels on January 1,
1984, and on January 1, 1985, TWU employees at Pan Am
will receive three wage increases and two cost of living adjust-
ments that were originally deferred under the 1981 contract
until January 3, 1982, and July 4, 1982.267
Flight attendants at Pan American agreed, in January,
1983, to a 10 per cent reduction in wages for 15 months. The
flight attendants also agreed to certain changes in work rules
intended to give management greater flexibility in scheduling
flight attendant work hours. Finally, as a result of the conces-
sion granted Pan Am, not only did the membership of all five
major unions at Pan Am collectively receive representation
on the company's board of directors, but employees also
gained a stock investment plan giving them one dollar of
company stock for every five dollars of lost earnings.268
7. Republic Airlines
Labor negotiations at Republic Airlines in 1983 resembled
1983 negotiations at Eastern Airlines. Earlier in the year
IAM and Republic agreed on substantial wage increases for
the airline's mechanics. 269 Subsequently, in November, 1983,
IAM and other major unions representing Republic employ-
ees consented to a temporary 15 per cent pay cut affecting a
large majority of Republic employees. 270 Thereafter, in De-
cember, 1983, Republic proposed extension of the 15 per cent
pay cut through 1986.271 As of April 5, 1984, only ALPA had
accepted extension of the pay cut.272 The Coalition of Un-
ions of Republic Airlines have counterproposed establish-
ment of an employee stock ownership plan. 27' Republic
proposed a stock ownership plan tied into company profits,
but the Coalition of Unions of Republic Airlines is opposed
267 Id
U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 30, 1984, at 63.
29 106 MoNrHLY LAB. REV. 72 (1983).
270 Id
271 Id
272 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 62, March 30, 1984, at A-8.
27. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 248, Dec. 28, 1983, at A-8; Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 246, Dec. 21, 1983, at A-5.
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to a stock ownership plan contingent upon company
profitablilty. The plan proposed by the unions calls for an
immediate contribution of newly issued Republic common
stock carrying sole voting rights."'
8. Trans World Airlines
In November of 1983, ALPA ratified a 20-month agree-
ment in behalf of TWA's pilots, reducing their pay to 10 per
cent for a fifteen month period. The pilots also agreed to a 20
per cent reduction in vactions, a 25 cents per hour cut in ex-
pense money, and more flexible hours which permits TWA to
schedule pilots for 70 to 80 hours in-flight hours per month.275
In exchange, TWA has given the pilots greater job security
and restored pay concessions previously accepted by low-sen-
iority workers in order to avoid layoff.2 76 TWA is currently
negotiating for similar concessions from IAM and the In-
dependent Federation of Flight Attendants. 277 In early 1983,
TWA reduced the pay of 5,100 non-union salary employees
by 10 per cent and indefinitely postponed all salary and bene-
fit increases. The airline announced plans to reduce its labor
force from 29,500 to 26,000 employees.278
9. United Ai'rlnes
Flight attendants at United agreed to a two-tier wage plan
in March, 1984. Existing flight attendants will receive a 6
per cent wage increase over the 37 month span of the con-
tract, but new flight attendants will start at a level approxi-
mately 25 per cent less than the previous base rate. New
flight attendants will advance to the upper tier after 5 years
of service.279
In 1982, United and its 14,000 employees belonging to the
27 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 248, Dec. 28, 1983, at A-8.
275 Id
276 BNA-Collective Bargaining Negotiations & Contracts, Dec. 8, 1982, at 1.
2 In January, 1984, the Independent Federation of Flight Attendants rejected a
TWA proposal calling for $28.5 million in pay cuts over an 18-month period. Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, Jan. 27, 1984, at A-I 1.
270 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 231, Nov. 30, 1983, at A-8.
279 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 49, March 13, 1984, at A-6.
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IAM agreed to a 28-month contract providing for approxi-
mately an 18 per cent wage increase during the life of the
contract. The contract also provided substantial increases in
pension benefits and health care. This contract becomes
amendable in November, 1984.
10. USA ir
Effective April 1, 1983, flight attendants at USAir agreed
to a contract calling for a 9.27 per cent raise over the 17-
month period of the contract. The flight attendants also re-
ceived a 5 cents per hour increase in per diem pay in both
1983 and 1984, and maternity leave was extended from three
to six months. The new contract does not include any work
rule changes for the flight attendants.8
In December, 1982, USAir and ALPA agreed to a 30-
month contract providing for a 3.75 per cent increase in De-
cember, 1982, a 5.25 per cent increase in December, 1983,
and a 4 per cent increase in December, 1984. As with the
flight attendants, USAir increased the per diem 5 cents per
hour both for 1983 and 1984. The 1982 contract increased
maximum sick leave accrual from 140 to 150 hours.281
Earlier in 1982, USAir and IAM reached an agreement on
a 28-month contract covering mechanics and other ground
service employees. During the 28-month term of the con-
tract, IAM employees at USAir will receive a 24.8 per cent
wage increase. Terms of the IAM-USAir contract are similar
to terms of the United Airlines-IAM contract also negotiated
in 1982.82
11. Western Airlines
Unions representing Western Airlines employees have ac-
cepted a "partnership plan" under which the company's ten
thousand employees will receive stock totaling 32.4 per cent
of the company in exchange for bargaining concessions.283
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 53, March 17, 1983, at A-I.
2", BNA-Collective Bargaining Negotiations & Contracts, Dec. 23, 1982, at 1.
282 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 165, Aug. 25, 1982, at A-6.
2.. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 220, Nov. 14, 1983, at A-7, A-8.
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Western's labor cost cutting program also includes a profit
sharing plan. Most employees will participate in the distribu-
tion of 15 per cent of pre-tax profits of the first $25 million of
pre-tax profits and 20 per cent of company profits exceeding
$25 million.284 The plan will be extended by Western if prof-
its are less than $2 million during 2 of the 3 years of the
plan.2 8 5
Under the plan, pilots will receive an 18 per cent pay cut,
management will take a 12.5 per cent cut and other workers
will receive a 10 per cent pay reduction. A coalition of the
unions representing Western's employees will also designate
two representatives to serve on the company's board of direc-
tors.2 6 Western management anticipates a $41.7 million dol-
lar payroll savings during the first year of the plan with
additional savings in coming years.
D. Union Concessions in Perspective
Concession bargaining has been the airline industry's most
common approach to reducing labor costs since deregulation.
Although some concessions, such as American's two-tier wage
plan and agreements concerning flexible job scheduling and
assignments, are designed to have a long term effect, most
union concessions to the major air carriers will not facilitate a
prolonged reduction in labor costs. Unless there is a signifi-
cant increase in labor costs for airlines that are currently non-
union, however, major carriers that fail to reduce the percent-
age of revenues spent on labor costs over the years to come
will find it increasingly difficult to be competitive.
IV. CONCLUSION
Deregulation of the airline industry has resulted in a dual-
ity in labor costs among the nation's air carriers. Older air-
lines with a long history of collective bargaining have been
forced to compete with new airlines paying substantially
-' CALIF. BUSINESS, March 1984, at 55.
SId
For a detailed discussion concerning Western's efforts to reduce operating costs,
see Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
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lower wages and enjoying greater flexibility in employee
scheduling and job assignments. All of the major carriers
have attempted to reduce overall labor costs in recent years
to be more competitive with new non-union carriers, and
some have gone so far as Chapter 11 reorganization to escape
burdensome obligations under their collective bargaining
agreements. There remains a sizeable difference in labor
costs among the airlines, however, and the number of new
non-union carriers is increasing. Because the airline industry
is labor intensive and unusually competitive, the long term
prospects for retention of significant market share by the ma-
jor carriers appears remote if the duality in industry labor
costs continues unabated. In the long run, success or failure
of airline deregulation may turn on the ability of major air-
line management and labor to establish parity in labor costs
throughout the industry.

